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School Finance Litigation Comes to North Carolina
On May 25, 1994, the debate over education funding in North
Carolina intensified when five low-wealth school districts and students
in those districts filed Leandro v. State,1 a suit that charges the State
with failing to provide proper resources to educate North Carolina
children.2 The suit marks the beginning of a struggle that many other
states have experienced? Because education is so vital to our society
1. No. 94 CVS 520 (N.C. filed May 25, 1994).
2. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 2, Leandro v. State, No. 94 CVS 520 (N.C. filed May 25,
1994); see also Tim Simmons, Suit Hits School Funding, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh),
May 26, 1994, at Al (describing the lawsuit).
3. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Parker v.
Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D.
Minn. 1971); Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd mern., 397 U.S.
44 (1970); McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd mem. sub nom.
McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Opinion of the Justices, 624 So. 2d 107 (Ala.
1993); Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30,
651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert denied sub
nom. Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977) (Serrano II); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241
(Cal. 1971) (Serrano 1); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982)
(en banc); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d
156 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Blase v. State, 302
N.E.2d 46 (Ill. 1973); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989);
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Skeen v. State, 505
N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993); Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont.
1989); Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349 (Neb. 1993); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A2d 359 (NJ.
1990); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), cert. denied sub nom. Dickey v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1974) (Robinson 1); Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch.
Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982); Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ.,
86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 432, disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987);
Bismark Public Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994); Board of Educ. v.
Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Fair Sch. Fin.
Council of Okla., Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Coalition for Equitable Sch.
Funding, Inc. v. State, 811 P.2d 116 (Or. 1991) (en banc); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139 (Or.
1976); Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d
470 (S.C. 1988); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Seattle Sch. Dist. No.
1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978) (en banc); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va.
1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1
v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
Many commentators have discussed these cases and the legal theories supporting
them. See, eg., Kate Strickland, Ph.D., Note, The School Finance Reform Movement, A
History and Prognosis: Will Massachusetts Join the Third Wave of Reform?, 32 B.C. L.
REv. 1105 (1991); William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School
Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REv. 597 (1994)
[hereinafter Thro, Judicial Analysis]; William E. Thro, The Role of Language of the State
Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation, 79 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 19 (1993)
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and integral to our daily lives, any conflict over the issue is certain to
arouse strong emotions and heated debate Although some states
have experienced great revitalization of their entire educational
systems through school finance litigation,5 the result in many other
states has been anger, confusion, and more litigation, with few good
solutions and no end in sight.'
This Comment attempts to explain the history, process, issues,
and possible outcomes of the upcoming school finance litigation in
North Carolina. Part I addresses the history and development of
school finance litigation throughout the nation.7 Part II outlines the
history of public school financing in North Carolina and describes
current funding problems.' Part III focuses on the current suit,
Leandro v. State,9 and evaluates the plaintiffs' claims in light of North
Carolina case law, federal constitutional law, and relevant decisions
from other states.'0 Part IV surveys various materials and opinions
from other states and speculates on the possible policy implications of
a North Carolina court decision." The Comment concludes with the
argument that, although school finance litigation may be long and
difficult, it can be an ideal opportunity for defining the state's
commitment to education and setting the state on a planned,
coordinated path designed to provide all children with the education
they need to compete in the next century.1
2
[hereinafter Thro, Role of Language].
4. See Strickland, supra note 3, at 1105.
5. See Bert T. Combs, Creative Constitutional Law: The Kentucky School Reform
Law, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 367,376 (1991); Richard Fossey, The Constitutional Duty to
"Cherish" Public Schools in Massachusetts: More Than a Matter of Money, 87 Educ. L.
Rep. (West) 699, 702, 706-08 (1994); Ronald G. Dove, Jr., Acorns in a Mountain Pooh
The Role of Litigation, Law and Lawyers in Kentucky Education Reform, 17 J. EDUC. FIN.
83, 105-17 (1991); see also infra note 543 and accompanying text.
6. See Gail F. Levine, Meeting the Third Wave: Legislative Approaches to Recent
Judicial School Finance Rulings, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 507, 509-13, 515-16, 542 (1991);
Joshua S. Wyner, Toward a Common. Law Theory of Minimal Adequacy in Public
Education, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 389,398 (1994); see also infra notes 487-500 and
accompanying text. See generally Mark Yudof, School Finance Reform in Texas: The
Edgewood Saga, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 499,499 (1991) (comparing school finance reform
to a Russian novel: "it's long, tedious, and everybody dies in the end").
7. See infra notes 13-81 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 82-189 and accompanying text.
9. No. 94 CVS 520 (N.C. filed May 25, 1994).
10. See infra notes 190-451 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 452-535 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 536-44 and accompanying text.
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I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF SCHOOL FINANCE
LITIGATION
A. The Problems
With the advent of comprehensive public schools, almost every
state adopted a system of financing that relied on local property taxes
to fund local school systems.' The conflicts over school financing
that have been litigated during the past thirty years arose out of the
disparities that are inherent in this type of system.'4 Because taxes
for public schools were not universally popular, state legislatures
declined to levy state taxes to fund public schools; choosing instead
to leave the taxing authority to the local governments, which
implemented property taxes.' However, counties with higher
property values could maintain lower property tax rates and still
produce more revenues for public schools than could poorer counties
with higher tax rates. 6 As a result, extreme inequalities developed
among the local school systems of many states.'7 Today, small
"enclaves of affluence" exist alongside poor inner-city and rural
school districts throughout the United States.'
Most state governments contribute to local educational funding,
and many even have equalization programs that attempt to relieve
disparities between wealthy and poor school systems. However,
localities are still expected to provide a large portion of the money
necessary for public educational operations. This scheme perpetuates
funding inequalities. 9 There is considerable debate over the effect
13. See William E. Thro, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional
Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1647-48
(1989) [hereinafter Thro, To Render Them Safe].
14. Kern Alexander, The Common School Ideal and the Limits of Legislative
Authority: The Kentucky Case, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 341,348 (1991); Thro, To Render
Them Safe, supra note 13, at 1647-48.
15. Alexander, supra note 14, at 348.
16. Id.
17. Id. For example, at the time of Kentucky's school finance suit, the poorest county
spent $1,700 per-pupil while the wealthiest spent $4,800 per-pupil. Id.; see also infra notes
128-31 (describing spending disparities in North Carolina).
18. Alexander, supra note 14, at 348.
19. Thro, To Render Them Safe, supra note 13, at 1647. In North Carolina, local funds
account for 25% of operation expenditures. NORTH CAROLINA CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
A RIGHT DENIED: EDUCATIONAL INEQUITY IN NORTH CAROLINA'S SCHOOLS, A
REPORT TO THE NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY 10 (June 5,1991) (citing NORTH
CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, NORTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SCHOOLS
STATISTICAL PROFILE 1990, 1-41 (1990)) [hereinafter A RIGHT DENIED]; see also infra
1995] 2125
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of disparities in school funding on student achievement,' ° but there
is some consensus that inadequate funding is linked to low achieve-
ment.2' Concern over the perceived deleterious effects of inadequate
school funding on student achievement has led to lawsuits in a
majority of states.2
B. The Three Waves of Reform Litigation
William E. Thro, the Assistant Attorney General of Colorado
and an expert in school finance law z has divided the history of
American school finance litigation into three sections, or "waves."'24
Thro's "waves" scheme has been generally accepted by school finance
scholars,' and is helpful in understanding the issues in school finance
suits and the development of the applicable legal theories.
The first wave began in 1971 with a California case, Serrano v.
Priest,l and ended abruptly at the United States Supreme Court
with a Texas case, San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez.27 In Serrano, the California Supreme Court held that the
state's funding plan, a typical system based on local property tax
revenues, violated the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and
state constitutions because of the extent to which educational
expenditures were influenced by the wealth of individual neighbor-
notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
20. Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation,
28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 316 (1991) [hereinafter McUsic, Education Clauses]; Fossey,
supra note 5, at 708-10.
21. See, eg., Charles S. Benson, Definitions of Equity in School Finance in Texas, New
Jersey, and Kentucky, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 401, 402 (1991); Fossey, supra note 5, at
708-10; Martha Minow, School Finance: Does Money Matter?, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
395, 400 (1991); Thro, To Render Them Safe, supra note 13, at 1649. But see Eric A.
Hanushek, When School Finance "Reform" May Not be Good Policy, 28 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 423, 425 (1991); Richard J. Murnane, Interpreting the Evidence on "Does Money
Matter?", 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 457, 464 (1991). See generally JONATHAN KOZOL,
SAVAGE INEQUALrrIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLs (1991) (recounting author's
observation of vast disparities during visits to schools across the country).
22. See Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 598 n.3.
23. Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 19.
24. William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and
Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. &
EDUC. 219, 222-32, 250 (1990) [hereinafter Thro, The Third Wave].
25. See, e.g., R. CRAIG WOOD & DAVID C. THOMPSON, EDUCATION FINANCE LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE AID PLANS-AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES
90 (1993); Levine, supra note 6, at 507 n.1; McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at
314; Strickland, supra note 3, at 1125.
26. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
27. 411 U.S. 1, reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973); see also Thro, The Third Wave, supra
note 24, at 222-23 (introducing the wave theory).
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hoods.O The court held that the difference in per-pupil expenditures
among the various school districts had a significant impact on the
quality of education in the low-wealth districts, and that this disparity
denied poor children equal protection of the law.29 In striking down
the California financing method as unconstitutional, the court ack-
nowledged the importance attached to education in the United States
Supreme Court's opinion in Brown v. Board of Education m In
Brown, the Court stated: "Today, education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments.... It is the very
foundation of good citizenship.... In these days, it is doubtful that
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education."'" The language in Brown and the
Serrano court's analysis of the equal protection claim together
suggested broad grounds for judicial intervention, and the first wave
began as suits were filed in more than thirty states.
32
However, decisions in many of these cases were never rendered.
In 1973 the United States Supreme Court halted the first wave by
upholding the Texas finance system in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez.3 3  The Court held that education,
although important, was neither explicitly nor implicitly established in
the text of the Constitution as a fundamental right. 4 Moreover, the
Court refused to recognize classification by wealth as "suspect" for
the purpose of equal protection analysis; thus, strict scrutiny did not
apply.35 Instead, the Court applied the more lenient "rational basis"
28. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1244.
29. Id. at 1247.
30. Id. at 1256.
31. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
32. Strickland, supra note 3, at 1128; Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 224 n.24
(citing Betsy Levin, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation: A Commentary,
1977 DUKE L.. 1099, 1099).
33. 411 U.S. 1, 6 (1973); see also Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 224-25
(describing the impact of Rodriguez on the first wave of litigation).
34. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
35. Id. at 40-41; see also John Dayton, An Anatomy of School Finance Litigation, 77
Educ. Law Rep. (West) 627, 638-40 (1992) (discussing Rodriguez and its impact);
Strickland, supra note 3, at 1129 (describing Rodriguez and its methodology); Thro, The
Third Wave, supra note 24, at 224-25 (discussing Rodriguez). The Supreme Court uses
different levels of scrutiny for equal protection claims under the Constitution. Claims
under statutes that involve a fundamental right, such as the right to vote, or a suspect
classification, such as race, are strictly scrutinized by the Court and are generally found to
be unconstitutional. Under strict scrutiny, the court considers whether the state action
bears a necessary relationship to a compelling governmental interest. Statutes not
involving a fundamental right or a suspect class are subject to a more lenient rational basis
test to determine whether the challenged state action bears a rational relationship to a
1995] 2127
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scrutiny and held that the inequities of the Texas system did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause," because the system of funding
was rationally related to the state's interest in maintaining local
control over education.37
With Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court effectively
closed the door on school finance reform litigation based on the
federal Equal Protection Clause." School finance reform litigants
were forced to turn to a new strategy: protection under state
constitutions?9 A New Jersey case, Robinson v. Cahill,4' pioneered
this strategy and began the second wave.4'
Robinson was decided within days of the Rodriguez decision, and
the second wave of cases mounted quickly.42 The Robinson court
considered whether New Jersey's public schools had met the state's
constitutional mandate of "a thorough and efficient system of free
public schools"'43 and found that they had not because of discrepan-
cies in per-student funding.' 4 Robinson demonstrated that state
constitutions provided two sources of claims for litigants-one based
on equal protection clauses, and the other based on the guarantees of
public education provided in education articles in almost every state
constitution.45  The two sources of claims worked together: the
legitimate state interest. See Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 225 nn.28-30. The
Court ignored several earlier holdings implicitly based on wealth as a suspect class. See
Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 224 n.28; see, eg., Harper v. Virginia State Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (holding monetary barriers to the right to vote
unconstitutional); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (holding that criminal
defendants may not be denied appeals of right because of inability to pay for trial
transcripts).
36. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55; see also Strickland, supra note 3, at 1128 (discussing
Rodriguez).
37. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55.
38. Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 225. However, some commentators
believe that the federal constitution may still provide relief. See, eg., Julius Chambers,
Adequate Education for Al" A Righ An Achievable Goal, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
55, 68-72 (1987); James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political
Reconstruction, Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 VA.
L. REV. 349, 405-13, 416-23 (1990).
39. Strickland, supra note 3, at 1132.
40. 303 A.2d 273 (NJ. 1973) (Robinson 1).
41. Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 228.
42. 1&
43. See Robinson I, 303 A.2d at 285 (quoting N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1).
44. I& at 295; see also Strickland, supra note 3, at 1133 (describing the Robinson
court's methodology).
45. Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 228-30. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 11,
§§ 1-10; N.D. CONST. art. VII, §§ 1-6; TEx. CONST. art. 7, § 1. Thro maintains that every
state but Mississippi has an education article. Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at
[Vol. 732128
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education article in the state constitution demonstrated that education
was a fundamental fight, and the state's equal protection clause
prohibited wealth-based disparities in the level of education provided
by the state."
According to the Rodriguez Court, the test for a fundamental
right under the federal Constitution is whether the text of the
Constitution explicitly or implicitly establishes the right.47 Had state
courts uniformly applied the Rodriguez analysis of fundamental rights
to their own constitutions, they would have been forced to recognize
education as a fundamental right, because almost every state
constitution explicitly provides for an educational system.
However, not all state courts accepted Rodriguez,49 and the decisions
of the second wave became so inconsistent that the opinions offered
little guidance to potential plaintiffs, commentators, or other courts.50
The second wave of cases ultimately failed to bring about successful
finance reform litigation.5' From 1983 to 1989, no state invalidated
its funding scheme; school finance reform litigation was considered a
dead issue.5'
In 1989, however, state courts in Montana, Texas, and Kentucky
struck down school funding schemes on state constitutional
grounds.53 The third wave began with these three monumental
229; Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 19. But see McUsic, Education Clauses,
supra note 20, at 311 n.5 (arguing that the Mississippi clause does require a system of
schools).
46. Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 228-30.
47. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
48. Dayton, supra note 35, at 638-39.
49. Id. at 639.
50. Compare Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979) (holding that
education is a fundamental right under the West Virginia constitution) with Olsen v. State,
554 P.2d 139, 147 (Or. 1976) (rejecting the state constitution's equal protection clause as
a basis for reform); see also Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 231-32 & nn.56-57
(describing the unpredictable outcomes of the second wave cases).
51. Id. at 232. Thro, obviously frustrated in his attempts to construct a pattern of the
second wave cases, stated that "[r]egardless of when the case was brought, the state
constitutional provision relied upon, or the wording of the state constitutional provision,
the outcomes were totally unpredictable." Id. at 231-32.
52. Fossey, supra note 5, at 704; William E. Thro, The Significance of the Tennessee
School Finance Decision, 85 Educ. Law Rep. (West) 11, 19 (1993) [hereinafter Thro,
Tennessee]; Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 232.
53. In Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989), the Montana
Supreme Court found that the state system, where property tax revenues and federal funds
provided 35% of educational funding, caused disparities in educational quality, id. at 686-
88, and violated the state constitution's mandate of a" 'basic system of free quality public
elementary and secondary schools,' " id. at 686-88 (quoting MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1).
Disparities in per-pupil expenditures were as high as eight-to-one due to disparities in local
1995] 2129
2130 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
victories for school finance plaintiffs,' and a new litigation strategy
emerged that state courts found more attractive than the strategies
employed in the second wave.5 Since then, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court has again declared the state's system unconstitutional,56
and Tennessee,57 Massachusetts,58 and Arizona 9 have followed in
property values. ld. at 686. The funding disparities resulted in substantial differences in
the quality of education provided. Id. at 687-88. The Montana Supreme Court based its
decision on the plain meaning of the constitutional education provision and failed to reach
the equal protection issue. ld. at 690-91; see also Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24,
at 234 n.77 (discussing the Montana Supreme Court's methodology). The Texas Supreme
Court, in Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989), found a 700-
to-1 property wealth disparity between some districts, id. at 392, and concluded that a
system with such inequalities was not encompassed by the constitutional drafters' choice
of an" 'efficient system,' " id. at 393 (quoting TEx. CONST. art. 7, § 1). In addition, the
court declared that the system failed to provide for a " 'general diffusion of knowledge' "
throughout the state, as was also required by the constitution. Id. (quoting TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 1). In Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989), the
Kentucky Supreme Court took a bold step by finding education to be a fundamental right
under the state's constitution. Id. at 215. The court found that students in property-poor
districts were afforded inferior educational opportunities, and held that the system failed
to meet the constitutional standard of "an efficient system of common schools." I& at 189
(quoting KY. CONST. § 183). Dramatically, the court then declared Kentucky's entire
system of public schools unconstitutional. Id. at 215. This holding forced the legislature
to restructure the state school system. Alexander, supra note 14, at 343; see also Fossey,
supra note 5, at 706 (discussing Rose and its impact).
54. Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 238 n.105 ("Prior to 1989, there had never
been more than one victory in a single year."). Thro pointed out the persuasive value of
the three decisions for subsequent state court decisions: Reliance on state educational
clauses by these three courts made it easier for other courts to justify pro-reform results
and to move away from other negative precedent. Id. at 242; see also infra notes 221-50
and accompanying text (discussing negative precedent in North Carolina).
55. See Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 241-42; Thro, Tennessee, supra note
52, at 19-20; see also infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (explaining the advantages
of litigating solely under state constitution education articles).
56. See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). The Abbott court held the state's
educational financing system unconstitutional with regard to the poor, urban districts of
the state. ld. at 363. The court's rationale rested on the state education clause, but the
decision does not represent the typical school finance reform case. Benson, supra note 21,
at 412-14. In addition, Abbott may demonstrate how future courts will deal with the
problems of urban schools-some of the worst educational situations. See Benson, supra
note 21, at 413; see also infra notes 444-51 and accompanying text (discussing Abbott and
its applicability to Leandro v. State).
57. See Tennessee Small Sch. Sys., Inc. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993).
The court based its decision to strike down the state's educational funding system on the
state constitution's equal protection clause. Id. at 152-57. Applying a rational relation test
similar to that used by federal courts, the Tennessee Supreme Court found the Tennessee
financing system irrational and not sufficiently related to local control of education. Id.
at 154-57 (citing Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983)). The
court's use of the equal protection clause broke from the recent trend of reliance on the
education clause; however, the court still found that the education clause established a
qualitative standard of education. Thro, Tennessee, supra note 52, at 13, 21-22; see also
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the third wave of litigation.6°
The third wave cases differ from the previous two waves in
several respects. First, the decisions are generally based on the
education clauses in state constitutions.6 1 Many commentators agree
that reliance on an education clause rather than an equal protection
theory is a better litigation strategy, and courts seem more receptive
to this type of argument.' Education clause arguments make it
easier for a court to decide in favor of reform because the decision
rests only on interpreting the state constitutional language that defines
the legislature's duty to provide an educational system.' Courts had
been reluctant to reform education funding by designating education
as a fundamental right, or poverty-stricken students as a suspect class,
infra notes 80, 377-79 and accompanying text (discussing the language of the Tennessee
Constitution).
58. See McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass.
1993). The McDuffy court followed in the footsteps of the Kentucky Supreme Court by
finding a duty under the state constitution to provide an educational system of high
quality. Id. at 554-55; see also Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 612-13 (describing
the quality standard required in McDuffy). The court held that the state had failed in its
obligation under the education clause to educate "all its children, rich and poor, in every
city and town of the Commonwealth." McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 548. For further
discussion of the Massachusetts decision see infra notes 343-44, 376, 399, 417 and accom-
panying text.
59. See Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994). The
Arizona Supreme Court found that the state's system of financing public schools violated
the state's education article requiring a" 'general and uniform' "system of public schools.
1d. at 808 (quoting ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1). The court held that the "general and
uniform" language required more than a uniform framework, but did not require actual
equality among schools. Id. at 814. The court found that a system that provided
"sufficient funds to educate children on substantially equal terms" met the "general and
uniform" requirement. Id. Because the financing system itself caused the inequalities, the
legislature had failed to satisfy its constitutional mandate. Id. at 815-16.
60. Although two victories in the second wave were based solely on education clauses,
see Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273,295 (N.J. 1973); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585
P.2d 71, 77 (Wash. 1989), commentators failed to credit the decisions as significant because
the second wave is seen as very incoherent. See Thro, Tennessee, supra note 52, at 18-19;
supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. However, many commentators now include the
Robinson and Seattle cases in the class of cases in which school finance systems were
overturned through the use of the education clause strategy. See Fossey, supra note 5, at
705-06; Levine, supra note 6, at 508 n.9.
61. Levine, supra note 6, at 508; Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 239-40.
62. McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 308-10; Thro, The Third Wave, supra
note 24, at 241; Thro, Tennessee, supra note 52, at 19-20; see e.g., Roosevelt Elem. Sch.
DisL No. 66, 877 P.2d at 811 (Ariz. 1994).
63. Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 241; see supra notes 45-48 and
accompanying text (demonstrating that almost all state constitutions require a system of
public education); infra notes 309-414 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of the
legislature's duty under the language of a state education clause).
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because these broad pronouncements would increase litigation in
areas unrelated to school finance.' In contrast, a court that defines
the legislature's duty under an education clause produces virtually no
impact in other areas of the law.' In an education clause case, a
court can evaluate the language and requirements of the state
constitution and then determine whether the legislature's performance
meets the constitutional mandate.66 These claims have other
advantages as well. They do not conflict with federal laws in any way,
and they do not force the plaintiffs or the court to prove a link
between educational spending and student achievement; rather, they
merely require the court to determine if the system set up by the
legislature meets the terms of the state's constitutional mandate.
67
Another difference between the third wave cases and previous
cases is evident in the manner in which courts evaluate the legislation.
The decisions of the courts hearing these cases have been based on
the "quality" of education being offered rather than the equality of
funding and resources.68 In most of the cases, the court struck down
the state's school finance system not because of fiscal inequalities, but
64. McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 309-10; Thro, The Third Wave, supra
note 24, at 241-42.
65. Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 241; McUsic, Education Clauses, supra
note 20, at 309-10.
66. Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 241. Thro also points out that state
courts, unlike federal courts, are allowed to develop constitutional law and may declare
greater rights under their state constitutions than those granted by the federal constitution.
Id. at 226-27.
67. MeUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 309-10. Equal protection claims,
unlike education clause arguments, have the potential to trap plaintiffs into theoretical
debates over "input measures." Id. at 315-16. Input measures refer to the dollars spent,
or what resources or equipment can be purchased with those dollars. Id. at 316 (citing
Betsy Levin, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation: A Commentary, 1977
DUKE L.J. 1099, 1107). In contrast, "output measures" involve the quality of education
received. Id. Although there is debate on the subject, output measures are often based
on student performance on achievement tests. Id. Because input measures are easier to
comprehend, courts often place the burden on the plaintiffs in an equal protection case to
show the relation between the money spent and the quality of education received. Id.
Through an education clause argument, however, the plaintiffs may bypass this morass by
arguing that the state's education clause demands a uniform system, which involves
comparison among districts rather than an often impossible statistical debate. Id. at 310,
315-16.
68. Thro, Tennessee, supra note 52, at 19; see, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ.,
Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989) (holding the entire system of public education un-
constitutional due to inferior education); Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d
684, 689 (Mont. 1989) (finding funding disparities but holding system unconstitutional




because some of the districts had fallen below the state constitution's
requirement of quality education.69 The courts have avoided ruling
on the issue of absolute equality of funding by simply ordering the
state to restructure the system. 0
Restructuring entire school systems to provide adequate quality
demonstrates another characteristic of the third wave suits: State
courts now seem to be more willing than pre-1989 courts to make
sweeping holdings and to exercise control over the finance system to
ensure its constitutionality.7' For instance, in Kentucky, the state
supreme court not only eliminated the entire bureaucracy of the
Kentucky public school system,' but also issued guidelines to the
legislature for formulating an adequate, constitutional system.'
Likewise, the Texas Supreme Court refused to accept a legislative
remedy enacted to correct the problems, holding that the new
statutory provisions still failed the constitutional mandate.74 Earlier
decisions from various state courts had often deferred to legislative
reforms
In addition to the significance of the rebirth of school finance
litigation, and its positive publicity and influence on potential plain-
69. Thro, Tennessee, supra note 52, at 19; see, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359,363
(N.J. 1990) (holding the financing system unconstitutional as applied to poor, urban
districts of the state); see also supra note 56; infra notes 436-37, 444-46 (further discussion
of Abbott).
70. Strickland, supra note 3, at 1144-45; see Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v.
Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 816 (Ariz. 1994); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212, 215; Helena Elem. Sch.
Dist. No. 1,769 P.2d at 691; Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391,396,399
(Tex. 1989); Alexander, supra note 14, at 363-65.
71. Thro, Tennessee, supra note 52, at 20. Alexander believes that while sweeping
holdings are attempts to control, they can also preserve the balance of power by allowing
legislative autonomy in restructuring the system. Alexander, supra note 14, at 364-65; see
also Levine, supra note 6, at 528-33, 541-42 (emphasizing that a narrow court mandate can
interfere with legislative reform options). For a discussion of judicial restraint in designing
a remedy, see infra noies 461-500 and accompanying text.
72. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215; see also Alexander, supra note 14, at 363 (discussing the
breadth of the Kentucky court's mandate); Strickland, supra note 3, at 1147 (providing an
overview of Rose); Thro, Tennessee, supra note 52, at 20 (reviewing the history of school
finance litigation).
73. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212.
74. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491,493 (Tex. 1991) (Edgewood
11).
75. Thro, Tennessee, supra note 52, at 20; see Washakie Co. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310,337 (Wyo. 1980) (recognizing the legislature's "valiant and sincere
efforts to arrange the financing of an adequate school program"); Note, Unfulfilled
Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1072, 1075-78
(1991) (discussing the deference of the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Robinson case).
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tiffs,76 the legal arguments developed in the third wave have inde-
pendent significance.7 The very fact that state constitutions contain
education clauses highlights the importance of education as a state
duty.78 Thus, the language of the clauses, their framers' intent, and
the history of their interpretation are likely to play an important role
in litigation strategy.79 In some cases, courts have simply interpreted
the language literally and have accepted the plaintiffs' interpretation
over that of the defendants.80  Nevertheless, the constitutional
76. Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 238. Clearly, a trend of winning cases
may encourage potential plaintiffs to file suits in their own states. Id. at 238. In support
of this point, Thro cites several legal articles, as well as articles on school finance in
national newspapers. Id. at 238 n.106.
77. See Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 238-40.
78. Id. at 239, 243-49; Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 22-23. Thro argues
that when history and precedent are inconclusive, the language of the education clause,
as categorized in his articles and by other scholars, should be determinative. In Thro's
opinion, this approach would help make school finance litigation more predictable and
legitimate. Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 31. See infra notes 318-39 and
accompanying text for further discussion of the classification of education articles and its
significance to Leandro.
79. See Strickland, supra note 3, at 1145.
80. Thro, Tennessee, supra note 52, at 25. The Tennessee Supreme Court suggested
that the wording of the education clause was a key issue. Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v.
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 148 (Tenn. 1989); see also Thro, Tennessee, supra note 52, at
21, 24-25 (describing how the Tennessee Supreme Court dealt with the language issue).
However, the court ignored the defendant's argument, which was based on commentators'
views that, compared to other state constitutions, Tennessee's represented a weak
commitment to a standard of education. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 150; see also MoUsic,
Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 338 (charaterizing Tennessee's education clause as
one that offers almost no support for educational quality); Thro, Role of Language, supra
note 3, at 23 (classifying Tennessee's education clause with other state clauses that
mandate only a "system of free public schools"); Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at
244 n.133 (citing Gershon Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective
Education in Basic.Skills, 63 TEx. L. REV. 777, 814-16 nn.143-46 (1985)) (classifying
Tennessee's education clause with other state clauses that offer a minimal commitment to
education); infra notes 318-39 and accompanying text (explaining commentators' clas-
sifications of the education clauses). Instead, agreeing with the plaintiffs' interpretation,
the court stated that the education clause indeed mandated an enforceable, qualitative
standard of education. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 150. The court failed to define the
standard, choosing to hold the system unconstitutional based on the state's equal
protection clause. Id. at 152-57; see also Thro, Tennessee, supra note 52, at 22 (discussing
the Tennessee court's use of the state constitution's equal protection clause). Thro
suggests that the Tennessee decision placed less importance on the exact wording of the
education clauses, relying more on the implications of the state equal protection clause.
Id. at 23-25; see also infra notes 318-31 and accompanying text (explaining the significance
of the language of education clauses).
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language and its interpretation appear to be the key battleground for
third wave litigants.81
II. SCHOOL FINANCE IN NORTH CAROLINA
A. History8
Of the original thirteen colonies, North Carolina was one of six
to include an education article in its first constitution,' and North
Carolina was second only to Pennsylvania in establishing a state
public school system.' 4 The state provided two-thirds of school funds
until the Civil War bankrupted the treasury.8 After the war, the
Constitution of 1868 gave the North Carolina General Assembly full
responsibility to provide "for a general and uniform system of public
schools. '8 6  Until the late nineteenth century, however, the General
Assembly could only require that taxes levied by counties (additional
property and poll taxes) be used for specified purposes&' Therefore,
school funding consisted of the state property tax, supplemented by
the counties' additional property taxes 8' This system was flawed
because many counties could not raise the needed funds without
exceeding constitutional property tax limitations.89 Moreover, efforts
by county commissioners to generate tax revenues specifically to fund
education were thwarted by a court ruling that taxes levied to finance
schools required approval by popular vote.9°
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Governor Charles B.
Aycock led the drive to increase state funding for education, and in
1901 the General Assembly doubled the state's funding commitment
81. See Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 245-50. Thro argues that the
interpretation of the education clause has remained the key issue in school finance reform
cases. See Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 605-15.
82. See infra notes 233-42, 340-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
North Carolina's school finance history relates to the legal issues of Leandro.
83. William E. Sparkman, The Legal Foundations of Public School Finance, 35 B.C.
L. REv. 569, 572 (1994).
84. Charles D. Liner, Financing North Carolina's Public Schools, SCH. L. BULL.,
Summer 1987, at 28,30 n.11. North Carolina's public school system was founded in 1838.
Id
85. Id. at 31.
86. Id. (quoting N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. 9, § 2).




90. Id; see Smith v. School Trustees, 141 N.C. 143, 156 (1906).
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in order to provide for a four-month school term in all districts.9 In
1933, when the Great Depression threatened the school system and
local governments, the General Assembly chose to save the system by
financing an eight-month school term,92 making North Carolina the
only state to fund its school system fully.93 The General Assembly
also established a funding system based on state grants supplemented
by county tax revenues.14 This system of financing-flat state grants
to each district based on the number of students in the district95 plus
local supplements from property taxes-remains virtually intact
today.96
Until 1985 this system continued with few modifications, despite
some disparities in local school districts that resulted from the use of
local supplements to the financing system.97 However, in the 1980s,
legislators began to notice that the percentage of total education
funding provided by the state was declining.9" In 1985, the General
91. Liner, supra note 84, at 31 (citing Act of Mar. 11, 1901, ch. 543, § 3, 1901 N.C.
Pub. Laws 749, 749). North Carolina continued to increase the funding for schools and
eventually enacted the Haig-Strayer foundation grant system that soon became popular
in many states. Id. This foundation grant system provided each county with the necessary
funding to finance the mandated term as long as the county continued to impose a
minimum property tax rate set by the state. Id. (citing Act of Mar. 9, 1927, ch. 256, § 4,
1927 N.C. Pub. Laws 621, 623).
92. Id. at 32 (citing Act of May 15, 1933, ch. 562, § 1, 1933 N.C. Pub. Laws 916, 917).
The legislature repealed all existing local school taxes but authorized localities to levy new
school taxes and draw on other revenue sources for supplemental school funding. Id. at
32. Therefore, the state accepted the burden of providing a basic level of support, but
allowed local units the discretion to supplement that support. Id.
93. Id.; A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 6. However, it appears that local funds
were still allowed and were still a part of the funding scheme. See Liner, supra note 84,
at 32.
94. Liner, supra note 84, at 32.
95. This financing pays for fixed numbers of teachers and certain operating expenses
without regard to the district's wealth or "local tax effort"-i.e., the amount a county or
school district taxes its citizens to provide funding for education. See WOOD &
THOMPSON, supra note 25, at 16-18; PUBLIC SCHOOL FORUM OF NORTH CAROLINA,
NORTH CAROLINA LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE STUDY, 1994, at 4 [hereinafter LOCAL
FINANCE STUDY]. To accurately rank the districts' support for education, the Public
School Forum's annual studies evaluate tax effort based on the tax rate for the district
compared with a district's ability to pay. LOCAL FINANCE STUDY at 4-5, 11-13; see infra
notes 113-32 and accompanying text (describing local effort in North Carolina).
96. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 7; see WOOD & THOMPSON, supra note 25,
at 37-38. The localities are responsible for almost all of their school facilities' needs. A
RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 10 n.30. See also infra note 187 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Critical School Facilities Needs Fund and the Public School Building
Capital Fund.
97. See Liner, supra note 84, at 32, 33-34.
98. See id. at 32. The state percentage share of the total educational expenditures fell
from 70% in 1947-48, to 67.5% in 1974-75, to 65% in 1984-85. Id.
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Assembly enacted the Basic Education Program (BEP) to reverse this
trend, and attempted to define the state's obligation of support to
include the elimination of some disparities between districts.99 By
increasing the funding levels of the previous per-pupil funding
scheme, the legislature intended to guarantee for all students in North
Carolina a comprehensive educational program conforming to
standards developed by the State Board of Education." Unfor-
tunately, the program has, fallen short of its goals; its per-pupil
method of distribution fails to provide sufficient funding for districts
with large populations of disadvantaged students, and fails to address
districts' facility needs.'0 ' Moreover, the program-originally
planned to be fully implemented by 1993-has yet to be fully
funded.'02
99. Id. at 28, 32, 37; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81(a) (1994) (defining the
mission of the BEP). Despite this language, there is no equalization mechanism included
in the plan. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81; see also A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19,
at 37 (criticizing the BEP).
100. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 7-8. The BEP did not attempt to replace the
existing flat grant program; rather, its purpose was to define the state's obligation under
the flat grant approach. See Liner, supra note 84, at 32. The BEP requires instruction in
"art, music, physical education, a foreign language, and computer skills," and sets
requirements for, among other things, student achievement as measured by test scores,
maximum class size, student-staff ratios, and instructional materials and equipment. A
RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 8 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81(b) (1994)). The
program is ostensibly guaranteed to every child in the public schools of the state. Id. at
8. But see infra notes 101-12, 135-37, 141 and accompanying text (describing the
inadequacies of the BEP and the funding of the program itself).
101. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 9, 36. Although the state and the BEP
recognize that greater resources are necessary to educate students from disadvantaged
backgrounds, the BEP distributes funds on a per-pupil basis without consideration of the
fact that some districts have disproportionately large populations of disadvantaged
students. Id. at 9 (citing Office of the State Auditor, Performance Audit Report, North
Carolina Department of Public Instruction, Chapter VII-Impact of the Basic Education
Program on Public Schools and a Review of School Financing 3,5 (1990)). Also, the BEP
sets standards for facilities but fails to assist with the resources required to meet the
standards. Id. at 36. Further, the BEP's mandates of class size and increased staff create
additional space and facility problems for low-wealth districts. Id.
102. Id. at 35-36. The scheduled funding was delayed and placed on a ten-year
implementation schedule and continues to fall further behind schedule. Id. at 35. The
program needs some $350 million of additional funds annually to be fully funded. Id. at
35; see also LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 2 (urging the 1994 session of the
General Assembly to fund the formula fully).
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B. Current Inequities0 3
A flat grant program providing significant base support from the
state on a per-pupil basis-such as North Carolina's BEP-would
seem to alleviate inequities because it provides equal amounts of
money to districts with equal numbers of pupils."°  However,
empirical analysis has demonstrated that there are disparities in the
system." s In addition, reports have noted that the state's per-pupil
method of distribution in fact enhances inequality:"°6 Larger school
systems benefit from greater economies of scale, 7 and wealthy,
populous communities receive money shifted away from the less
populated, impoverished districts."8 There is also evidence that the
103. The following section provides a factual assessment of the inequalities of the North
Carolina school finance system. See infra notes 190-258 and accompanying text for a
description of the equality issues of Leandro.
104. See Liner, supra note 84, at 34.
105. LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 4-6. The Public School Forum has
conducted studies for the years 1987-1994 that recognized the disparities.
106. See, e.g., PUBLIC SCHOOL FORUM OF NORTH CAROLINA, ALL THAT'S WITHIN
THEM 1 (Dec. 1990) [hereinafter ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM]; NORTH CAROLINA RURAL
EDUCATION INSTITUTE, ARE EQUAL ADM ALLOTMENTS EQUITABLE? 2-5 (Apr. 1,1992)
[hereinafter ADM ALLOTMENTS]; PUBLIC SCHOOL FORUM OF NORTH CAROLINA,
GRADING ON THE CURVE 3 (Feb. 1993) [hereinafter GRADING ON THE CURVE]; LOCAL
FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 4-6; A POSITION PAPER OF THE EASTERN NORTH
CAROLINA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ON EQUALIZATION OF EDUCATIONAL OPPOR-
TUNITY IN NORTH CAROLINA 1 (Apr. 1993) [hereinafter EASTERN NORTH CAROLINA];
A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 10-19. But see Liner, supra note 84, at 33-35 (arguing
that the effects of disparities in spending are reduced by the high level of state support).
Publications of the Public School Forum are available from the group's Raleigh, North
Carolina office. Other publications of the Public School Forum are cited supra at note 95.
107. Economies of scale is an economic concept illustrating that marginal costs increase
more slowly as an operation becomes larger. See ALL THAT'S WrrHIN THEM, supra note
106, at 14. A concept familiar to business, it is also applicable to schools and school
systems. See id. For example, it is less expensive to offer a curriculum to 800 students
receiving the state's per-pupil allotment than to offer the identical program to a school of
275 students. Id. Because state allotment formulas are based on typical schools, small
schools and small school systems suffer under the current funding method. Id.; see also
ADM ALLOTMENTS, supra note 106 at 2-4 (describing how larger systems benefit from
economies of scale).
108. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 17. A little over one-fourth of North
Carolina's 100 counties are generally classified high-wealth; these counties have 40% of
the school-age population and therefore receive a similarly large share of the state's per-
pupil-based allotments. GRADING ON THE CURVE, supra note 106, at 3; see also ADM
ALLOTMENTS, supra note 106, at 2-4 (discussing the impact of decreasing enrollment on
the financial resources of a school system). The North Carolina Rural Education Institute
also argues that the problems will worsen as low-wealth areas of the state continue to lose
population to the wealthy areas and as per-pupil funding to these areas decreases due to
declining enrollments. ADM ALLOTMENTS, supra note 106, at 3-4; see also EASTERN
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BEP itself has increased disparities between poor and wealthy
counties rather than alleviating them.1°' According to the Eastern
North Carolina Chamber of Commerce, statistics from 1982-83
(before the BEP) revealed a gap of $661 per-pupil in funds received
from the state between a typical elementary school in a wealthy
county and a similar school in a poor county."' Statistics from
1990-91 (after the BEP's implementation) showed a $1,495 per-pupil
difference."' Even after the BEP, the most significant disparities
exist as a result of the relative wealth of the districts themselves."
Currently, state support is insufficient to cover all necessary
operating costs of school systems in North Carolina; as a result, local
funding provides around twenty-five percent of the total education
budget." In addition, the state provides very little funding for
capital projects-only about five percent of all public education
captial outlays."4 Therefore, differences in a district's wealth directly
affect the amount of money the district has available to spend on
education." For example, Hoke County, one of the plaintiffs in
Leandro, has an adjusted tax base per child of $110,296 and total local
spending per-pupil of $467, while Dare County, the county ranked
highest in ability to pay, has an adjusted tax base per child of
$1,059,100 and total local spending per-pupil of $2,410."6 A district
with a large tax base holds an advantage in raising revenues: it may
tax its citizens at lower tax rates than a district with a small tax base,
NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 106, at 1-2 (describing migration to the wealthy counties
and benefits of economies of scale in large counties).
109. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 35-37; see also EASTERN NORTH CAROLINA,
supra note 106, at 3 (arguing that the BEP does not address the problem of inequity in
school funding).
110. EASTERN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 106, at 3.
111. Id.
112. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 10-11. The relative wealth is mostly a result
of property wealth disparities, see infra notes 115-21 and accompanying text; however, it
also includes per capita income. The average per capita income in the 74 low-wealth
counties is about $2,100 less than the state average and about $4,000 less than that of the
five wealthiest counties. GRADING ON THE CURVE, supra note 106, at 3 (citing data from
North Carolina Department of Public Instruction).
113. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 10. "All localities use local revenues to
supplement their state share." Id. Because the BEP is not fully funded, the state's
contribution falls below the cost of what the state itself has guaranteed as a basic
education. Id. at 36.
114. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 10.
115. LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 5; A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at
11.
116. LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 14-15, 20.
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while still collecting more tax revenue. 7 For example, a one cent
property tax increase in a poor county, with a tax base of around $600
million,"8 would only raise eleven dollars per school-age child."'
In contrast, a wealthy county, with a tax base of $4 billion, would
raise over $100 per child."2 Despite comparatively meager amounts
of potential revenue, North Carolina's poor counties tax themselves
at much higher rates than wealthy counties: The ten poorest counties
in the state average a tax rate of seventy-five cents per $100 of
assessed real estate value, while the wealthiest ten counties average
fifty-two cents per $100.121
"Property-poor districts" also suffer from what economists term
"municipal overburden."'" North Carolina requires counties to
provide funding for services such as jails and waste disposal."3
Unlike most other states, North Carolina also requires a county to
provide matching funds for state-mandated welfare payments. 4
These matching funds impose a heavy burden on the poorest counties,
which face a host of societal problems as well." For example, one
plaintiff in Leandro, Hoke County, must spend a third of its local
revenue to meet its welfare obligation, while a wealthy county, like
Mecklenburg, spends less than seven percent of its budget on
117. Id. at 5; A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 11. The wealthy counties are wealthy
only in comparison to the poor counties of the state and not in comparison to wealthy
counties of other states; the state's poorest counties rank among the poorest in the nation.
ALL THAT'S WrrHIN THEM, supra note 106, at 3.
118. Hoke County, one of the Leandro plaintiffs, has an adjusted property tax base of
$589,754,323. LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 19.
119. LOcAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 5.
120. Id. Dare Country has an adjusted tax base of $4,111,427,668. Id.
121. Id. When all counties are included, the average state tax rate is 60 cents per $100.
Id
122. Id.; EASTERN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 106, at 1-2. Municipal overburden
is the concept that localities must shoulder a large portion of the costs of human services
ranging from welfare to solid waste disposal. ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM, supra note 106,
at 6, 15; A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 17. The burden falls most heavily on poorer
counties, which often face higher costs of human services and have nearly exhausted their
tax bases. ALL THAT'S WrrHIN THEM, supra note 106, at 15-18; A RIGHT DENIED, supra
note 19, at 17.
123. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 17.
124. LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 6.
125. Id. at 6-7; EASTERN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 106, at 2. Poor counties, which
face skyrocketing welfare and social service costs due to large low-income populations, also
tend to have disproportionate numbers of children living in poverty. See UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION:
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACtERISTICS-NORTH CAROLINA 326-35 (1993).
Therefore, in many of these low wealth counties, a cycle of "educational deprivation" and
poverty continues. EASTERN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 106, at 2.
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matching welfare funds." Thus, disparities in local school funding
are exacerbated by the costs of addressing local social needs."z
Although North Carolina's school districts are not "as starkly
unequal" as districts in some other states,"m the differences are quite
substantial nevertheless.' 9 For instance, the state's top ten counties
annually spend $1,294 more per-pupil than the bottom ten coun-
ties.' When $1,294 per-pupil becomes $33,644 for an average class
of twenty-six and $647,000 for a school of 500 children, it is clear that
the gap is considerable.' The spending discrepancies affect
numerous aspects of local public education, including curriculum
quality, staffing, supplies, student achievement, and school facilities
themselves.?3
The curriculum selection in a school in North Carolina is often
a clear indicator of a district's wealth.'3 Low-wealth schools are
unable to offer courses that more affluent schools may consider
basic. 3" For example, calculus-a course with a demonstrated
positive effect on college admissions test scores-is not included in the
BEP and therefore must be supported by local funds. 5 Small and
poor schools often cannot afford to offer a range of courses, especially
in areas such as math and science, because it is too expensive to hire
enough teachers and, in the case of small schools, to schedule classes
126. LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 6.
127. See id. at 6-7; see also ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM, supra note 106, at 15-18
(describing state and federal burdens placed on localities, their increasing costs, and some
proposals for relief). See LoCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 3 (citing
demographics of the five plaintiff counties).
128. ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM, supra note 106, at 2; see also supra note 53 and
accompanying text (describing disparities found by courts in other school finance cases).
129. ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM, supra note 106, at 2; LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra
note 95, at 5.
130. LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 5.
131. Id. Other figures show slightly higher discrepancies: $1,800 per student and
$47,000 for an average class of 26 and more than $900,000 for a school of 500. NORTH
CAROLINA LAW AND EDUCATION PROJECr, WHO WILL CONTROL PUBLIC EDUCATION
IN NORTH CAROLINA: THE COURTS OR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY? 1 (1994) [hereinafter
CONTROL].
132. See infra notes 134-68 and accompanying text. School facilities are provided
almost solely by localities. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-408 (1994); A RIGHT DENIED,
supra note 19, at 10; see also infra note 187 (describing nominal state support for facilities).
133. See ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM, supra note 106, at 7-8; A RIGHT DENIED, supra
note 19, at 26-27.
134. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 27.
135. ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM, supra note 106, at 8. A study by the Educational
Testing Service found that students who had taken calculus scored, on average, 37 points
better on the Scholastic Achievement Test than those who had taken only pre-calculus.
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for very small numbers of students.136 Even subjects ostensibly
covered by the BEP, such as art and music, often go unscheduled in
poor school districts due to staff shortages. 37
Low-wealth counties experience staffing problems due in part to
a lack of resources." While wealthy counties can supplement state
salaries to attract more experienced and better-trained teachers to
their schools, poor counties often cannot. 39 In addition, good
teachers and staff frequently choose schools in wealthy areas because
teaching and social environments are more attractive; with low sup-
plements-or none at all-poor counties suffer a double disadvantage
in hiring quality teachers.'4 Wealthy schools can also hire a greater
number of teachers, and while some well-to-do schools have fulfilled
their BEP requirements ahead of schedule, many poor schools fall
beneath the BEP specifications for adequate teaching staffs.
141
Other staff areas also suffer: Poorer schools often cannot afford to
hire librarians, counselors, and nurses, even though it is generally
agreed that disadvantaged children need more of these resources than
do wealthier children. 42
Poor teaching environments are exacerbated by lack of supplies,
a perennial problem in many poor counties. School library
collections are out-of-date, and some schools cannot even supply
enough textbooks.'" Classes that require laboratory equipment,
such as biology and chemistry, have few or no supplies." Com-
puter hardware and software are outdated and scarce.'46 In fact,
many school buildings are so old that their wiring cannot support
136. Id.; A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 26. A RIGHT DENIED also highlights the
lack of funding for vocational education programs, noting that a rural high school in
Jackson County had 116 fewer curriculum choices than a large urban high school in
Durham County. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 26-27.
137. Id. at 27.
138. Id. at 28.
139. Id. The report states that in 1991, 44 school systems were unable to provide any
local supplements to their teachers. Id.
140. See generally EASTERN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 106, at 2 (describing the
drain of qualified workers from many low wealth areas).
141. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 28. Due to shortages, teachers are often
forced to teach outside of their areas of training. IM.
142. Id. at 29-30.
143. Id. at 23-25.
144. Id. at 23.
145. Id.; see ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM, supra note 106, at 8.
146. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 23-25
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computer labs.'47 In contrast, affluent schools may offer media cen-
ters, extensive libraries, and a vast array of supplies for classes and
activities, such as a kiln for the art room, digital equipment for
chemistry, and a publishing center for the student newspaper.
148
Although many factors affect student performance, it is difficult
to deny the correlation between resources-such as curriculum,
staffing, and supplies-and achievement. 49  For example, the
average Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) score of the top five counties
in the Public School Forum's Ability to Pay survey of North Carolina
counties was more than 120 points above that of the lowest-ranked
counties in the survey. 5 These top five counties spend significantly
more per student than any of the lower-ranked counties.' In many
poor counties in North Carolina, including some that are Leandro
plaintiffs, students test one to two years behind the state average
score on standardized tests.5 End-of-course tests reveal the
greatest disparities between students in poor schools and wealthy
schools in subjects requiring equipment for adequate instruction, such
as biology and chemistry" Also, all six of the systems that are on
warning status for not meeting the state's new accountability measures
are in some of the state's poorest counties and have the lowest per-
pupil expenditures.M  A school's curriculum affects the students'
standards and their progress through the system; therefore, schools
with limited course offerings also limit their students' achieve-
147. PUBLIC SCHOOL FORUM OF NORTH CAROLINA, BUILDING THE FOUNDATION:
HARNESSING TECHNOLOGY FOR NORTH CAROLINA'S SCHOOLS AND COMMuNmIES 44-45
(May, 1994) [hereinafter TECHNOLOGY]. See infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text
for a more detailed discussion of school facility needs, including those for technology.
148. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 25.
149. See ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM, supra note 106, at 7.
150. Id, The five highest ranked counties were Dare, Mecklenburg, Wake, Forsyth, and
Polk counties. The lowest ranked counties were Caswell, Bertie, Columbus, Robeson, and
Hoke. Id. Both Robeson and Hoke are plaintiff counties in Leandro. For more recent
ability-to-pay rankings, see LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 18-19.
151. ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM, supra note 106, at 7.
152. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 30-31. Mentioned are both Hoke and Halifax,
plaintiff counties in Leandro. Id. at 30. Some students have tested up to five grades
behind their actual grade levels. CONTROL, supra note 131, at 1. The gap between actual
achievement and grade level widens with time. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 30-31.
153. ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM, supra note 106, at 8.
154. LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 4. Four of the plaintiff coun-
ties-Halifax, Vance, Hoke, and Robeson-are included in this group. Tim Simmons,
State's Worst Schools Give Board a Lesson, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), June 2, 1994,
at IA.
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ment. 55 These statistics do not merely reflect slower students, for
even those students from impoverished areas who are bright enough
to be admitted to the state's university system disproportionately
require time in remedial classes to catch up with their peers. 56
Over twenty-five percent of state university students admitted from
poor counties need remedial course work. 7 Thus, the inequalities
affect even those students who should be among the best and
brightest of the state's future work force. 58
Most critically, low-wealth school systems lack adequate
buildings.159  About fifty percent of school buildings in North
Carolina were built before 1960 and around thirteen percent were
constructed between 1900 and 1939.1 Many poor districts lack
resources to pay for new construction or maintenance and repairs.
Many buildings are not fire-resistant and contain asbestos and faulty
wiring, as well as other safety and health hazards. 6' Space is a
problem in many schools, and mobile units are often the only feasible
alternative to provide additional classroom space 62
Not only are these old buildings unsuitable for general classroom
space,'"' but the facilities may prevent students in disadvantaged
counties from learning the modern technology they must understand
in order to compete in the job market."M Computer labs and
modern equipment require space, climate control, proper wiring,
telephone lines, and security systems. s Poorer, older schools are
often neither air-conditioned nor equipped with wiring adequate to
handle the high-tech systems.'6 Most classrooms do not have
155. Id. The report demonstrates this point by showing that a student would have no
incentive to strive to take a course such as Algebra I in 8th grade, as many students do,
if the high school's highest math class were Algebra II or Geometry. Id. A report from
1991 noted that in 26 poor school districts, not one student took an Advanced Placement
exam. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 26.
156. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 34.
157. Id. at 34 n.55. In addition, students from low-wealth districts fail to meet the state
university system's admission requirements at double the rate of students at other high
schools in the state. CONTROL, supra note 133, at 1.
158. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 33-34; see ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM, supra
note 106, at 7.
159. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 20; see also infra note 187 (describing nominal
state support for captial needs).
160. TECHNOLOGY, supra note 147, at 43.
161. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 20-21.
162. Id. at 20.
163. Id.
164. See TECHNOLOGY, supra note 147, at 43.
165. Id at 44-47.
166. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 20; TECHNOLOGY, supra note 147, at 44-45.
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telephone lines, or have lines that cannot accommodate computer
modems."6 Furthermore, the more technology is used, the greater
the costs become to operate, maintain, and protect that technolo-
gy." Low-wealth schools, already behind, will only fall further as
modem technology becomes more essential to education and the job
market.
As the Leandro plaintiffs realized, the disparities among North
Carolina's school districts make the state vulnerable to school finance
litigation. 69 However, hope that the state would address the
problems on its own initiative, without being forced to endure
expensive and disruptive litigation, prompted the plaintiffs to wait
until 1994 to file their case.1 0
C Efforts to Avoid Litigation
Publicity regarding the success of school finance litigation in
other states, particularly the third wave cases,' caused increased
concern that North Carolina would be the next defendant in a suit;
the obvious inequities in the current system became a hot issue.'
A 1990 report by the Public School Forum pointed out that, although
studies of inequities had been conducted previously in North Carolina,
one as early as 1925, few of the policy recommendations resulting
167. TECHNOLOGY, supra note 147, at 43, 46.
168. Id. at 46-47.
169. In addition, the needs of the wealthy districts in North Carolina deserve mention.
As already noted, see supra note 117, the wealthy districts are only wealthy in comparison
to the poorer districts in the state. ALL THAT'S WITHN THEM, supra note 106, at 3. The
author does not mean to imply that the wealthy urban districts of Wake and Mecklenburg
counties are as affluent as some other wealthy areas of the United States, such as wealthy
districts in California, New York, or Connecticut. I& No school in North Carolina
approaches the spending levels of most wealthy communities across the nation. LOCAL
FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 7. In addition, several of the urban counties in North
Carolina, such as Wake County, are facing critical space needs due to a rapidly increasing
population. Id. Other North Carolina counties, such as Durham, Guilford, and
Buncombe, struggle with consolidation and merger issues. Id. Finally, even in wealthy
urban areas, some inner-city problems are likely to develop, creating a costly at-risk
population of school children. I& Thus, few of North Carolina's schools are sufficiently
secure in their funding. It is not surprising that six wealthy urban districts-the City of
Asheville, Buncombe County, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Durham County, Wake County, and
Winston-Salem/Forsyth-have moved to intervene in the lawsuit. See infra notes 438-51
and accompanying text for a discussion of their claims.
170. See infra notes 182-89 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 53-81 and accompanying text (discussing the third wave cases).
172. See ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM, supra note 106, at 2; A RIGHT DENIED, supra
note 19, at 53.
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from those studies were ever enacted."' The Public School Forum
suggested that the state was a prime target for litigation because the
third wave legal theories, focusing on opportunities and educational
outcomes, addressed North Carolina's disparities more directly than
earlier equality arguments. 4 That study recommended that a
supplemental funding plan be formulated; 75 the task was under-
taken by the Public School Forum's Study Group III in 1991.176
Supporters of the supplemental funding plan promoted it as a defense
against possible litigation.177
Following the Study Group's recommendation, the General
Assembly initiated a supplemental funding program targeted at low-
wealth and small schools.'78 The funds are distributed each year
based on an ability-to-pay formula assessing such variables as district
property values and local tax effort, among others.'79 The sup-
plemental fund's purpose was to bring the low-wealth counties up to
the state average for local support.ls The projected annual cost of
fully funding this formula was approximately $198 million. 8'
173. ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM, supra note 106, at 1.
174. Id at 2. The report acknowledged that the disparities among North Carolina
districts were not as severe as those in some other states. Id.; see also supra notes 104-12
and accompanying text (discussing the deceptiveness of apparent equality among North
Carolina's districts).
175. ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM, supra note 106, at 11. The purpose of a supplemental
funding plan is to bring school spending in low-wealth counties up to the state average.
GENERAL BACKGROUND: Low WEALTH SCHOOLS SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING 3. A
supplemental plan differs from an equalization funding plan, which attempts to equalize
per-pupil spending in all districts. Id
176. LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 2.
177. Id
178. Id
179. See NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCION, Low WEALTH
SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING: WHAT REALLY CHANGED? 5-6 (July 1993) [hereinafter
CHANGES]. Other variables included per-capita income of the district and the county's
overall ability to generate revenue as compared to other counties. Ii. A county or district
must tax its local property at the state average effective tax rate, or must contribute more
local dollars to its schools than what the county should be expected to provide based on
state average local contributions and ability-to-pay rankings. Id. at 6. In disbursing the
funds, the formula gives the most money on a per-pupil basis to the poorest counties
meeting the criteria. Id. Along with a good explanation of the original formula, this
report shows the changes the General Assembly made in the formula in 1993. See id. at
5-6.
180. Low WEALTH SCHOOLS FUNDING AND EQUALIZATION CONSORTIUM, GENERAL
BACKGROUND: Low WEALTH SCHOOLS SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING 3-4 (1993) [hereinafter
GENERAL BACKGROUND].
181. Id at 4.
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Low-wealth and small districts hoped that litigation would not be
necessary to alleviate the disparities, but they were disappointed by
the 1993 session of the General Assembly." In that session, the
legislature appropriated more funds to the supplementation fund, but
the amounts fell far short of the full $198 million needed to fulfill the
formula.' Even worse, the General Assembly altered the funding
formula to make it appear that only $100 million-rather than close
to $200 million-would be needed to meet the program's goal.Y
This restructuring left some counties that previously were eligible for
the supplemental funding ineligible under the new formula."
Angered by this action, frustrated with the state's pattern of
failing to fund programs such as the BEP fully,"8 6 and disappointed
with the state's nominal efforts to aid funding of school facilities,"8
five counties decided to take the legal action they believed necessary
to force the state to deal with school finance issues.' s Five coun-
ties-along with students and parents of students from those
counties-filed Leandro v. State on May 25, 1994.' 9
III. LEANDRO V. STATE
The plaintiffs in Leandro allege that the state of North Carolina
has violated state statutes and the North Carolina Constitution by
failing to provide adequate and equal educational opportunities for all
182. See LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 2.
183. See id-; GENERAL BACKGROUND, supra note 180, at 4.
184. LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 2. One change in the funding formula
consisted of including additional sources of revenue that counties have available-such as
local sales and use taxes, food stamp reimbursements, fines, and forfeitures-in the
counties' ability to pay. CHANGES, supra note 179, at 5. Previously, property tax value
defined the formula. Id.
185. LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 2.
186, IA Although the BEP was not enacted as an equalization program, because it
provides money equally on a per-pupil basis, the BEP attempted to define the state's
obligation of support. The BEP also contained statements of legislative intent to pursue
true equalization plans. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81(a) (1994); GENERAL BACK-
GROUND, supra note 180, at 1.
187. See LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 2. By May 1994, only $10 million
was appropriated to the Critical School Facilities Needs Fund. I& The only state support
provided for capital projects, other than a portion of state sales tax revenues returned to
the counties, is channelled through two funds: the Critical School Facility Needs Fund, A
RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 7 n.18 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-489.1 to 489.4
(1994)), and the Public School Building Capital Fund, id (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-
546.1 to 546.2 (1994)). The amount of money from these three sources is small; in fact,
it only amounts to around 5% of annual capital expenditiires on education. Id.
188. LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 2.
189. No. 94 CVS 520 (N.C. filed May 25, 1994).
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of the students in its public school system." The plaintiffs include
the school boards of Hoke, Halifax, Robeson, Cumberland, and
Vance counties, children who are currently enrolled in these school
systems, and their parents. 9' The plaintiffs assert five claims for
relief against the State of North Carolina and the State Board of
Education: a claim under the equal protection clause of the North
Carolina Constitution; 9 two claims under the constitution's educa-
tion article;"9 a claim under the constitution's "law of the land"
clause;' and a claim based on various state statutes that guarantee
certain levels of education.95
A. Claims of State Constitutional Violations
According to Thro, a five-step judicial methodology for addres-
sing constitutional claims in school finance suits is emerging from
third wave cases.'96 The North Carolina court may be persuaded to
use this methodology, or some version of it, when it considers
Leandro because the methodology draws on the analyses of state
courts that have already dealt with these issues."9 The five steps
are: (1) determining if the suit is primarily an equality or a quality
suit; (2) analyzing the constitutional language to determine if a
specific quality standard is mandated; (3) describing the meaning of
that standard, if one exists; (4) applying the standard to the school
system in question; and (5) determining the role that inadequate
funding plays in the system's deficiencies, if the court identifies a
constitutional violation. 9 This part of the Comment analyzes the
Leandro plaintiffs' claim according to Thro's methodology.
190. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 2, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520).
191. Id at 2-5.
192. Id at 25 (citing N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19); see also infra notes 201-58 and
accompanying text.
193. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 24,26-27, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520) (citing N.C. CONST.
art. IX, § 2); see also infra notes 259-427 and accompanying text.
194. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 27, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520) (citing N.C. CONST. art I,
§ 19).
195. Id at 27-29 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 11SC-1, -81, -122(3), -408 (1994)); see also
infra notes 428-37 and accompanying text.
196. Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 604-08.
197. See id
198. Id. at 605-08.
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1. Determining Whether the Suit is an Equality Suit
or a Quality Suit
The first and most important step in Thro's methodology requires
determining whether the suit is primarily an equality suit, focusing on
the legislature's duty to provide an equal education for each student,
or a quality suit,' focusing on the legislature's duty to provide an
adequate education.' According to Thro, the characterization of
the suit. as equality or quality may determine the court's analysis and
methodology.' 1 An equality suit will follow the typical equal
protection analysis detailed below.' A quality suit, as characteris-
tic of the third wave, should follow some form of the Massachusetts
court's methodology described by Thro and discussed below.'
a. The Equal Protection Claim
The Leandro complaint, like most second and third wave
suits,' raises an equal protection claim under the state
constitution.1 However, Leandro is not merely an equality suit,
because the complaint raises education clause arguments as well as
equal protection clause arguments, and emphasizes educational
quality.'3°
Dual arguments of quality and equality under both clauses can
be confusing for many courts; therefore, it is difficult to predict how
a court will treat the claims.' However, there appear to be three
199. The terms "adequacy" and "quality" will be used interchangeably to describe suits
or claims that establish or assert that a state constitution's education article requires a
certain standard of educational quality. See Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 605;
McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 308-09 (referring to the claims as "minimum
standards claims").
200. Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 605.
201. Id.
202. Id.; see infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
203. Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 599 n.17, 605-06; see infra notes 285-427
and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 42-81 and accompanying text (discussing second and third wave
cases).
205. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 25, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520); see also Thro, Judicial
Analysis, supra note 3, at 609 (describing the nature of the third wave suits).
206. See Plaintiffs' Complaint at 24-27, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520) (emphasizing
equality of "opportunities" rather than simply funding). Thro notes that third wave
plaintiffs follow a pattern of raising both arguments while emphasizing quality. Thro,
Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 609.
207. See Thro, JudicialAnalysis, supra note 3, at 609. Interpreting a state constitution's
equal protection clause can prove difficult for a court because it may have little history or
precedent on which to rely. McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 312.
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general methods a court could use to handle these issues. First, a
court could apply its normal equal protection analysis to the claims,
just as courts did in the second wave of reform.' To prevail under
this method, the plaintiffs would have to show that education
qualified as a fundamental right under the constitution,' or that the
state's funding system was irrational,21 two hurdles that the second
wave cases frequently could not surmount."' Second, the court
could disregard the equality issues and concentrate on the quality
analysis.2" For instance, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
analyzed a school finance case as a quality suit, although it failed to
state explicitly whether the suit was an equality or quality suit.2"
Third, a court could merge the two claims by applying both analy-
ses. 14 A Tennessee court employed this approach and found both
that an adequate education was a fundamental right, and that the
system was irrational under the state constitution's equal protection
clause.T
The Leandro plaintiffs' inclusion of the equal protection claim
reflects a trend in recent litigation that demonstrates renewed
confidence in the effectiveness of equal protection arguments.216 If
the North Carolina courts choose to use a standard equal protection
208. Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 605; see supra notes 42-52 and
accompanying text (discussing second wave suits generally based on equal protection
claims); see, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 930 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied sub nom.
Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359,361 (Conn. 1977).
209. If the plaintiffs could establish that education is a fundamental right under the
state constitution, the school system would most likely be subject to strict scrutiny. See
supra note 35 (explaining levels of scrutiny under the federal constitution); see, e.g., Pauley
v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979).
210. If the plaintiffs did not prevail on the fundamental right issue, the state's financing
system would be subject to the more lenient rational relation test. See supra note 35 and
accompanying text; see e.g., Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Ark.
1983).
211. Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 230-31. See also supra notes 47-52 and
accompanying text (discussing problems of the second wave of reform).
212. Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 604-09. The analysis for quality suits will
be discussed infra at notes 285-427 and accompanying text.
213. McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 522 (Mass.
1993). The McDuffy court noted, however, the plaintiffs' assertion that the state denied
them "the opportunity to receive an adequate education." Id.; see also Thro, Judicial
Analysis, supra note 3, at 608-09 (detailing the McDuffy court's methodology).
214. See Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 609; Thro, Tennessee, supra note 52,
at 21-22.
215. Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tenn. 1993); see
Thro, Tennessee, supra note 52, at 21-22 (discussing the significance of the Tennessee
decision); supra note 80 and accompanying text.
216. Thro, Tennessee, supra note 52, at 25-26.
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analysis or a merged equality and quality analysis, the plaintiffs must
argue either that education is a fundamental right under the North
Carolina Constitution or that the current funding system is irrational.
The Leandro plaintiffs prepared for both possibilities. They claim a
fundamental right to education under the constitution,217 and also
allege that the state system is irrational and arbitrary because it allows
the funding and quality of education to vary according to where
children live.218
The argument for education as a fundamental right poses a
challenge for the plaintiffs, not only because declaring a fundamental
right will necessarily affect other areas of the law,219 but also
because there is contrary precedent in this area." In 1987, several
North Carolina school children attempted to bring the second wave
of reform to the state in Britt v. North Carolina State Board of
Education.21  The plaintiffs were minors enrolled or soon to be
enrolled in the public schools of Robeson County. They alleged
that the state's financing system created inequities within Robeson
County's multiple school districts and between Robeson County and
other counties in the state, and that these disparities violated both the
equal protection clause and the constitutional duty of a general and
uniform system of schools.' The Court of Appeals dismissed the
complaint, finding that the state constitution guarantees equal access
to public school education, but it does not require the state to provide
absolutely equal educational opportunities to all students.'
The court looked to the 1970 revision of the state
constitution and determined that the uniformity and equality
provisions were simply replacements for those "obsolete provisions"
requiring separation of the races.' Therefore, it concluded,
217. See Plaintiffs' Complaint at 25, Leandro (94 CVS 520); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15;
art. IX, §§ 1, 2.
218. Plaintiff's Complaint at 25, Leandro (94 CVS 520).
219. See McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 312-14; supra notes 65-68 and
accompanying text.
220. See Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 432,
disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 282, 357 S.E.2d at 432. Robeson County is again a plaintiff in the Leandro
case. See Plaintiffs' Complaint at 3-4, Leandro (94 CVS 520).
223. Britt, 86 N.C. App. at 283, 357 S.E.2d at 433.
224. Id. at 289, 357 S.E.2d at 436.
225. N.C. CoNsT. art. IX § 2(1).
226. Britt, 86 N.C. App. at 286-87, 357 SE.2d at 434-35 (citing Report of the North
Carolina State Constitution Study Commission 34 (1968)).
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"equal" meant equal access to the public schools of the state for all
races; the constitution did not require identical opportunities for
each student.s The court determined that the drafters of the 1970
revision of the constitution intended to preserve the previous system
entirely, except for its obsolete and unconstitutional "separate but
equal" provisions.' The court also stated that the intent of the
drafters and the people adopting the provision commanded more
respect than the actual language of the clause.' Because ine-
qualities in district property wealth had existed in 1970, and because
the constitutional history contained no discussion of revising the
school financing system, the court held that the constitution did not
require identical opportunities for each student."' The court then
deferred to the legislature's selection of the funding formula, since it
involved a " 'political question.' "23
The Britt decision has been the object of significant criticism.233
One report accused the court of ignoring the plain language of the
constitution, and cited evidence suggesting that the court's
interpretation of the constitution did not accurately reflect the
227. Id. at 290, 357 S.E.2d at 436.
228. Id. at 289,357 S.E.2d at 436 ("Our Constitution clearly does not contemplate such
absolute uniformity across the State.").
229. Id at 287,357 S.E.2d at 435 (citing Report of the North Carolina State Constitution
Study Commission 34 (1968)).
230. Id. at 286, 357 S.E.2d at 434.
231. Id. at 288-89, 357 S.E2d at 435-36.
232. Id. at 290,357 S.E.2d at 437 (citations omitted). The court stated that because the
plaintiffs claimed no right recognized under the constitution, they were merely questioning
"the wisdom of the Legislature in providing for the present method of funding public
education." Id Because the matter was of legislative concern and therefore a political
question, the court dismissed the complaint. Id. The North Carolina Supreme Court
declined to review the decision. Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 320 N.C. 790,
361 S.E.2d 71 (1987) (denying discretionary review). The political question issue could
resurface in the present suit; however, the third wave has overcome separation of powers
problems in some states, including Kentucky, because of the strong separation of powers
language in their state constitutions. Combs, supra note 5, at 370; see also KY. CONsr. §
28 ("No person or collection of persons, being of one of those departments, shall exercise
any power properly belonging to either one of the others .. . ."). In addition, the
education clause claims arguably give the court more flexibility to preserve legislative
authority in its verdicts. The Kentucky Supreme Court used this flexibility to overturn the
entire system, which left the legislature with only broad guidelines rather than a narrow
judicial mandate eliminating certain types of reform options. See Rose v. Council for
Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212, 215 (Ky. 1989); Alexander, supra note 14, at 363-
65; Levine, supra note 6, at 542; see also supra notes 62-67, nfra notes 294-99 and accom-
panying text (discussing advantages of education clause claims).




framers' intent2z ' The language by which North Carolina
demonstrated its commitment to education in its very first state
constitution ' provides a strong argument that education is a
fundamental right in North Carolina. 6  The North Carolina
Constitution provides, "The people have a right to the privilege of
education, and it is the duty of the state to guard and maintain that
right."'-z7 The education article creates a general and uniform
system of education, makes attendance compulsory, and declares that
"the means of education shall forever be encouraged.'-38 The Britt
court failed to consider the history of the text of the 1868 education
clause, 9 which was similar to the revised education clause. °
Testimony from the Constitutional Convention of 1868 reveals the
delegates' goal of " 'level[ing] upwards' " the difference in the
education that was available to rich and poor children of the state.'4'
In addition, case law from as early as 1871 emphasized the importance
234. Id. The report offers two reasons for its conclusion that the Britt court erred in
interpreting the "equal opportunities" language added to the 1970 Constitution as merely
eliminating obsolete segregationist provisions. Id at 49-50; see N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1).
First, A RIGHT DENIED cites a 1968 report prepared by the Governor's Study Commission
which stressed the importance of equal educational opportunities for all children. A
RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 49 (citing "A CHILD WELL TAUGHT," THE REPORT OF
THE GOVERNOR'S STUDY COMMISSION ON THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM OF NORTH
CAROLINA (1968)). A RIGHT DENIED argues that the study commission report influenced
the decision to add the "equal opportunities" language to the education article to
strengthen the "general and uniform" language. Id. at 49-50; see N.C. CONST. art. IX, §
2(1). Second, the report accuses the court of ignoring precedent that interpreted the
segregationist language as supportive of equalized financing. A RIGHT DENIED, supra
note 19, at 50 n.91 (citing Hooker v. Greenville, 130 N.C. 472, 474, 42 S.E. 141, 141
(1902)).
235. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, § XLI 9 (stating that "a school or schools, shall be
established by the legislature, for the convenient instruction of youth, with such salaries
to the masters, paid by the public"); see also Liner, supra note 84, at 30 (describing how
North Carolina's system of public education developed).
236. See A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 37-44; see also supra notes 83-96 and
accompanying text (discussing the history of school finance in North Carolina).
237. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15.
238. N.C. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 2(1), 3.
239. See A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 40, 49-50. The 1868 education clause
read: "Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged."
N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 1. "The general assembly, at its first session under this
Constitution, shall provide by taxation and otherwise, for a general and uniform system
of public schools .... ." d. § 2.
240. See Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282,287,357 S.E.2d
432, 435, disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987).
241. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 40-41 (citing JOURNAL OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 487 (N.C. 1868)).
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of education.2 2 Until Britt, school reformists had reason to believe
that it was likely that the court would declare education to be a fun-
damental right in North Carolina.
On the issue of equality under the Equal Protection Clause, the
Britt court declined, like other second-wave courts,24 3 to find that
unequal funding failed under rational basis analysis.2' The court
asserted that the constitutional provision expressly authorizing local
revenues to supplement the state's funding directly contradicted the
plaintiffs' arguments and "the possibility that exactly equal
educational opportunities can be offered throughout the State."245
The Britt court's disregard for the history of the 1970 constitutional
studies and proposals-proposals which had led to the addition of the
language "wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all
students"'  to the education clause 247 -allowed the court to
conclude, contrary to a literal reading of the language, that equal
opportunities were not required.2 The revised language obviously
strengthened the education clause's requirement of equality,249 but
the Britt court's focus on the need to revise the constitution to rid it
of segregationist provisions allowed it to avoid the stronger
interpretation advocated by the plaintiffs.'
Even if the Leandro court follows the Britt court's reasoning,
Leandro could still result in school finance reform in North Carolina
through equal protection analysis. It is possible for a third wave case
to result in the reversal of earlier school finance decisions. The
Montana Supreme Court, in Helena Elementary School District No. 1
242. Id at 41 (citing Lane v. Stanly, 65 N.C. 153, 157-58 (1871)). In Collie v. Commis-
sioners, a 1907 case, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that "we must assume that
there is no article in our organic law which the people regarded as more important to their
welfare and prosperity [than article MX]." 145 N.C. 170, 174,59 S.E. 44,45 (1907); see also
A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at43 (arguing that early court cases provide precedential
support for the proposition that education is a fundamental right under the North Carolina
Constitution).
243. See Thro, JudicialAnalysis, supra note 3, at 609; Thro, The Third Wave, supra note
24, at 230-31; see supra note 35 and accompanying text (explaining levels of equal
protection scrutiny); supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text (discussing second wave
equal protection claims and listing case citations).
244. See Britt, 86 N.C. App. at 288-90, 357 S.E.2d at 435-37.
245. Id at 288,357 S.E.2d at 435-36; see also supra notes 221-32 and accompanying text
(describing the rationale of Britt).
246. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
247. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 49-50.
248. See Brit4 86 N.C. App. at 287-88, 357 S.E.2d at 435.
249. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 50.
250. Britt, 86 N.C. App. at 290, 357 S.E.2d at 436.
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v. State,' 1 overturned an earlier case upholding the Montana finance
system. 2 Such a complete reversal suggests that stare decisis need
not be determinative in Leandro, especially if compelling facts, such
as increased funding disparities, demand a different result.03 The
plaintiffs in Leandro could argue that they have waited for full
implementation of the BEP, the state's supplemental funding, and
increased funding for facilities, and none of these reforms have
progressed as promised.P They could also cite studies that demon-
strate the widening of funding disparities." Furthermore, they
could point to discussions in other states that have breathed new life
into equal protection analysis in school finance cases. 6  The
plaintiffs in Leandro therefore were wise to include an equal
protection claim in their complaint. 7  Although the complaint
emphasizes quality over equality z 8 the plaintiffs nevertheless have
left every avenue open for the North Carolina courts to require
reform of the state's current finance system.
b. State Education Article Claim
Both equality and quality claims 9 may successfully be made
under the state constitution's education article. This section will
discuss each type of claim separately.
251. 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989).
252. See Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 238 (stating that Helena overturned
State ex. rel. Woodahl v. Straub, 520 P.2d 776 (Mont. 1974)).
253. See id. Thro agrees that evidence of increased funding disparities or new evidence
of the impact of disparities would be appropriate reasons for overturning a precedent. Id.
at 238 nn.108-09.
254. See LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 2; supra notes 171-81 and
accompanying text (discussing the need for funding under the BEP and the enactment of
the Low Wealth and Small Schools Supplemental Fund).
255. See LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 4-6.
256. In Tennessee, the Supreme Court accepted the theory that the state's system of
finance was irrational and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause. Tennessee Small
Sch. Sys. v. MeWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139,156 (Tenn. 1993); see also Thro, Tennessee, supra
note 52, at 26 (predicting that, if other states follow Tennessee's lead in using rational basis
review to strike school finance schemes, McWherter "will be regarded as one of the true
landmarks of the school finance litigation movement").
257. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 25, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520).
258. See id. at 24.
259. The distinction between quality and equality suits is described supra, at notes 199-
203.
260. McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 308-09.
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i. Equality Claim Under the Education Clause
The plaintiffs in Leandro assert that they have a fundamental
right to a general and uniform system of public schools under the
North Carolina Constitution.' They claim that the state's
educational system does not meet this constitutional mandate because
the quality of education varies throughout the state.262 The plain-
tiffs also allege that the state fails to provide equal educational oppor-
tunities for children as required by the state constitution.' Al-
though the complaint does not explicitly address the Britt
decision-which held that North Carolina was not required to provide
identical educational opportunities to all students4-it clearly seeks
to skirt that negative precedent. It argues that, although only
"substantial equality" is required under the constitution, the wide
disparities in funding show that the state's system does not provide
even that.2
Making an equality argument under the state's education clause
may help the plaintiffs avoid the equal protection traps that captured
many second wave cases. For example, the strategy avoids the
problem of having to demonstrate the correlation between dollars
spent and increased educational quality.' Instead, plaintiffs can
simply argue that the constitution requires a standard of equality for
the entire system, and that the legislature is failing its constitutional
mandate by allowing the system to continue with unequal funding.267
Thro and other scholars have categorized education clauses by
the extent to which they provide textual support for adequacy
261. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 26, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520). The plaintiffs contend that
Article IX, § 2 of the North Carolina Constitution establishes this right. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.; see also N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1) (stating that "equal opportunities shall be
provided for all students").
264. Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282,289,357 S.E.2d 432,
436, disc rev. denied, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987); see also supra notes 221-32 and
accompanying text.
265. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 26, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520). The plaintiffs could rely
on the persuasive authority of Roosevelt, which used a similar definition of "general and
uniform" to strike down Arizona's school finance scheme because the state failed to
educate the children of the state on "substantially equal terms" due to gross disparities
within the system. Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 814 (Ariz.
1994); see also infra note 273-76 and accompanying text.
266. See McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 315; see also supra notes 62-67
and accompanying text; infra notes 294-99 and accompanying text (discussing advantages
of education clause claims).
267. See McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 319.
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arguments. One scholar, Molly McUsic, has further categorized
education clauses by their textual support for equality arguments.2 6 9
North Carolina's education clause received high marks from McUsic,
who noted that it provides one of the clearest textual commitments to
equality by actually stating that "equal opportunities shall be provided
for all students."'27 In addition, the constitution uses the language
of uniformity, 7' which some courts have employed to overturn their
school finance systems.2 2
In Roosevelt Elementary School District No. 66 v. Bishop,273 the
Arizona Supreme Court found that the "general and uniform"
language appearing in the state constitution did not require identical
equality.274 Yet, the Roosevelt court concluded that school finance
systems "which themselves create gross disparities are not general and
uniform."'27  In addition, the Arizona court concluded that a
"general and uniform" system required "sufficient funds to educate
children on substantially equal terms. 276  In Rose v. Council for
Better Education, Inc.,2' the Kentucky Supreme Court used the
terms "uniformity" and "equality" interchangeably and held that an
efficient system required both elements.27 However, the Britt
268. Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 22-31; see also infra notes 318-25 and
accompanying text (detailing the categories of state constitutional education clauses).
269. See MeUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 319. McUsic classified the state
education articles by their support for an "equity" theory, id., and support for a
"standards" theory, id. at 326.
270. See id. at 321 (quoting N.C. CONST. art. IX, §2(1) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). McUsic acknowledged that the North Carolina Court of Appeals has
nevertheless held that this language does not require the state to "provide identical
opportunities to each and every student." Id. (quoting Britt v. North Carolina State Bd.
of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282, 289, 357 S.E2d 432, 436, disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C. 790, 361
S.E.2d 71 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
271. N.C. CoNsT. art. IX, § 2 (requiring a "general and uniform system of free public
schools").
272. See, eg., Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P2d 806, 815-16 (Ariz.
1994); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211-12 (Ky. 1989).
273. 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994).
274. Id. at 814.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
278. See id. at 211. Professor McUsic points out that "uniform" is generally interpreted
to mean "equal" and that courts may use the terms interchangeably. McUsic, Education
Clauses, supra note 20, at 322-23; see, e.g., Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 577 (Wis.
1989) (stating that the education article requires that the character of instruction be "as
uniform as practicable"); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391,396 (Tex.
1989) (using "uniform" and "equal" interchangeably to require "exactly the same
distribution of funds").
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decision, which stated that the language of the article was not as
important as the intent behind the provision,27 9 could have a nega-
tive effect on equality claims made under the education article in
North Carolina.' Because the Britt court concluded that the North
Carolina Constitution does not require absolute uniformity, it presents
a significant obstacle to the Leandro plaintiffs' equality claim. 1
The plaintiffs hope, however, that the North Carolina courts will alter
their interpretation of the constitution and read the language of the
education clause according to its plain meaning, as suggested by
McUsic.1 In addition, a North Carolina court might now be
inclined to examine decisions in other states where courts have
concluded that a logical and sound constitutional interpretation
required them to find a true mandate for the legislature under the
uniformity language.' Finally, the Leandro plaintiffs could argue
that the disparities of the current system are so far from absolute
uniformity that even the Britt requirement of "substantial equality"
is unfulfilled.'
ii. Quality Claim Under the Education Clause
Although analytically and methodologically distinct, equality and
quality claims" are interrelated.' Although there are ad-
279. Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282,286,357 S.E2d 432,
434, disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987).
280. The Britt court concluded that the uniformity language did not contemplate
"absolute uniformity." Id. at 289; 357 S.E.2d at 436. Another part of the Britt decision
demonstrates that the North Carolina Constitution is ambiguous on the issue of equality
because, although it requires equality, it grants localities the constitutional right to
supplement their schools with local funding. See id. at 288, 357 S.E.2d at 435-36; see also
N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(2) (authorizing local governments to "use local revenues to add
to or supplement any public school"). According to the Britt court, this right of local
supplements directly conflicts with the equality provision. Britt, 86 N.C. App. at 288, 357
S.E.2d at 435-36. For a full discussion of Britt, see supra notes 221-50 and accompanying
text.
281. See supra notes 221-50 and accompanying text.
282. See McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 320; see also supra notes 269-70
and accompanying text.
283. See Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806,815-16 (Ariz. 1994);
Rose v. Council for Better Edue., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989). According to
Thro, third wave decisions could start a revolution in school finance reform. Not only will
the education clauses take on more significance, but the courts will be forced to look to
other state decisions as weli. Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 241. A court may
find that reaching a different outcome than another state court with similar constitutional
language threatens its legitimacy. Id. at 248-49. For a discussion of a Montana decision
that overturned an adverse precedent, see supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
284. See Plaintiffs' Complaint at 26, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520).
285. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
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vantages to litigating under an adequacy theory, 7 adequacy of
education is difficult to measure, and there is a danger that the court
will adopt a minimal standard of adequacy.' Some scholars warn
against separating the two types of claims and proceeding solely on
the basis of adequacy.' Jonathan Kozol has expressed his concern
that an adequacy standard could be determined by the wealthy and
then imposed on the poor.29 Kozol believes that requiring equality,
rather than a minimum quality level, is fairer and more likely to bring
about true reform because the rich will not tolerate being leveled
down. To ensure their own children's education, then, the wealthy
will be forced to bring the poor schools up to higher standards.29'
As Kern Alexander has pointed out, "[A]dequacy is in the eye of the
beholder."2' However, Alexander has also recognized that adequa-
cy and equality are interrelated, and that it can be argued convincing-
ly that equal access to an adequate education is the real issue.2 3
Other scholars point out the advantages of adequacy claims.294
Such claims allow a court the flexibility to target the neediest children
and provide remedies tailored to their particular situation.295
Adequacy claims can also avoid the problems associated with
286. See John A. Nelson, Adequacy in Education: An Analysis of the Constitutional
Standard in Vermont, 18 VT. L. REV. 7, 18-19, 43 (1993).
287. See McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 315-17; supra notes 62-67 and
accompanying text.
288. See, eg., Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299,315 (Minn. 1993) (declaring that the state
"satisfied its constitutionally-imposed duty of creating a 'general and uniform system of
education' "by providing funding "in an amount sufficient to generate an adequate level
of education which meets all state standards").
289. See Nelson, supra note 286, at 18-19.
290. See i. (quoting an interview with Jonathan Kozol, the author of Savage
Inequalities); Lonnie Harp, School Finance Suits Look Beyond Money to Issues of Quality,
EDUC. WK., June 17, 1992, at 1, 28. See generally JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE
INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 206-33 (1991) (describing the author's
views about public education finance schemes).
291. See Harp, supra note 290, at 28; Nelson, supra note 286, at 18-19.
292. Nelson, supra note 286, at 18 (quoting Kern Alexander, School Financing as
Prescribed by the Fundamental Law of Vermont (1992) (unpublished manuscript on file
with Kern Alexander)). Kern Alexander is a leading expert and consultant in numerous
school finance reform cases. See id.
293. See Nelson, supra note 286, at 43 (referring to Alexander's testimony during Rose
v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 210-11 (Ky. 1989)).
294. See, e.g., Julius Chambers, Adequate Education for Al" A Righ An Achievable
Goal, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 55,61-62 (1987); McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note
20, at 339-40; Nelson, supra note 286, at 16-17.
295. Nelson, supra note 286, at 16; see also Abbott v. Burke, 575 A2d 359, 408 (N4.J.
1990) (holding that the state's school system failed its constitutional mandate with respect
to poor, inner-city schools).
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measuring inputs of educational quality, such as the amount of money
spent on education, and allow the court to concentrate on the
outcomes of education, including student achievement.296 Although
spending levels seem conceptually simple, outcome measures such as
student achievement and drop-out rates are actually more easily
presented to courts than the complex studies that may be required to
prove a correlation between spending and educational quality.
291
Courts can circumvent the scientific issues and simply assume that
wealthy schools would not waste money offering more classes or
better equipment if they did not improve performance.29 Adequacy
claims also allow courts the flexibility to render a broad verdict that
returns the policy-making power to fashion a remedy to the legis-
lature.299
296. McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 315; Nelson, supra note 286, at 17;
see also supra note 67 and accompanying text (defining input and output measures).
297. McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 315-16; see also supra note 67.
Convincing a court of the correlation may prove to be an impossible burden for plaintiffs
because social scientists cannot agree on whether educational expenditures and educational
quality are correlated. McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 316; see also supra
note 21 (citing various social science studies).
298. See McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 316-17. McUsic highlights the
trend in state courts hearing school finance cases of finding a link between spending and
quality based on common sense, practical considerations, and evidence that the wealthier
districts are not funding "frills." See id.; see, e.g., Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State,
769 P.2d 684,690 (Mont. 1989) (stating that the evidence "demonstrated that the wealthier
school districts are not funding frills or unnecessary educational expenses"); Washakie
County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334 (Wyo. 1980) (stating that "[i]t
would be unacceptable logic to deduce that wealthy counties are squandering their money"
from the fact that adequate education can be provided for less).
299. McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 330. The Kentucky court's holding
provides a good example of a flexible ruling that maintains enforcement power over the
legislature. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186,215-16 (Ky. 1989);
Alexander, supra note 14, at 364-65. But see McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20,
at 332 n.111 (noting that flexible decrees can lead to difficulties in interpreting and
enforcing courts' verdicts). The Kentucky court defined a constitutionally adequate
education by listing seven capacities all children in the state should develop: (1) oral and
written communication skills, (2) knowledge of social, economic, and political systems, (3)
understanding of governmental processes, (4) knowledge of mental and physical wellness,
(5) grounding in the arts, (6) training or preparation for academic work or a vocation
sufficient to choose and pursue work intelligently, and (7) sufficient academic and
vocational skills to compete favorably in academics or the job market with students from
other states. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212. The legislature's task was to design a new system
with these output goals in mind. Id.; see also Alexander, supra note 14, at 362-64
(analyzing the Rose decision and its impact on the Kentucky legislature's task). Similarly,
output standards were articulated by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in
Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979). McUsic asserts that goals such as
those of the Kentucky and West Virginia cases are too vague to be enforced. She
suggests defining minimum standards according to achievement tests to aid enforcement.
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Given these advantages and the success other third wave
plaintiffs have had with quality arguments under state education
clauses,3°° the plaintiffs' claim in Leandro that they have a fun-
damental right to "adequate educational opportunities"30' under the
North Carolina Constitution is well chosen. The plaintiffs recognize
the interrelation between equality and quality claims by stating that
inequities and inadequacies in opportunities result from inadequate
funding."°  They support their claim of inadequate funding by
asserting that the BEP has not been fully funded;"u however, they
are careful not to suggest that the BEP represents an adequate level
of funding.3 °' Instead, they argue that it represents merely the "mini-
mum" of what the state should provide."°
2. Analyzing Constitutional Language for a
Specific Quality Standard
If the court determines that the Leandro plaintiffs are primarily
making a quality or an adequacy claim, it should consider following
the remaining steps of Thro's methodology" to determine the
nature of the state's responsibility. The best example of the use of
this methodology is the Massachusetts case;3 7 other third wave cases
have used variations of the methodology. ° The crucial second step
in Thro's methodology is for the court to interpret the constitution's
education clause to determine whether it places a duty upon the
See McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 332. Alexander also acknowledges that
the verdicts attempting to define an adequate education are not without problems, see
Alexander, supra note 14, at 362 n.92, but he remains supportive of the Kentucky court's
approach, see id. at 362-63.
300. See supra notes 53-81 and accompanying text; see e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 213;
McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516,522,548 (Mass. 1993).
301. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 24, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520) (citing N.C. CONST. arts.
I, IX, § 2).
302. See id. at 24.
303. Id.
304. See id at 28-29 (seeking a declaration that North Carolina's system of funding
violated statutory requirements "by failing to provide every student with equal access to
the minimum requirements of the [BEP]" (emphasis added)).
305. Id.
306. See Thro, JudicialAnalysis, supra note 3, at 605-08; see also supra notes 196-98 and
accompanying text. Another commentator has proposed a similar methodology for
analyzing quality suits. See Dayton, supra note 35, at 641.
307. See McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 522-48
(Mass. 1993); see also Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 610-16 (discussing the
application and results of the McDuffy methodology).
308. See, e.g., Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.E.2d 139, 150-51 (Tenn.
1993); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
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legislature with regard to public education.3 If the court identifies
a duty, it must analyze the clause to see if the language suggests any
specific standard of educational quality.10  Scholars recommend
interpreting state education clauses with traditional constitutional
interpretation methods: 1' analysis of the language and text;31
historical analysis," including analysis of the intent of the framers
of the constitution,"4 analysis of other state court decisions;31" and
structural analysis. 316  William Thro also asserts that when history,
decisions from other jurisdictions, and state statutes are inconclusive,
the plain language of the clause should control.1 7
Without a doubt the most controversial aspect of the
interpretation of an education clause is the analysis of its language.
Many scholars have categorized the language of state constitutional
education clauses,31 8  but there is disagreement over the
309. See Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 610.
310. Id.
311. Nelson, supra note 286, at 21-22 & nn.79-80. These methods are not discrete
entities but often overlap and involve analyzing the same sources. See infra notes 314-15.
312. Nelson, supra note 286, at 21; Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 25-27. The
language or textual analysis involves determining the plain meaning of the text. See Id. at
25. Earlier decisions in the same jurisdiction that interpret the language of the provision
are helpful. See Nelson, supra note 286, at 22.
313. Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 25; Nelson, supra note 286, at 21.
Historical analysis involves an examination of the constitutional history of the education
clause, any records of the intentions of the framers who drafted the provision that are
available, and any precedential court interpretations of the provision. See Thro, Role of
Language, supra note 3, at 25 & n.41; Nelson, supra note 286, at 22 & n.81.
314. Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 22 n.22, 25 nA1. Determining the
intentions of the constitution's framers involves surveying the constitutional records and
documents leading up to the final version of the constitution. See id. at 25 n.41 (citing
Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46, 49 (IlL 1973)). It may also involve examining current
influential writings or opinions of the time. Cf. A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 49-51
(analyzing the significance of the Governor's Study Commission Report on the drafting
of the North Carolina education clause).
315. Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 25; Nelson, supra note 286, at 21. This
area also relates to textual analysis because a court may find other state decisions
interpreting similar constitutional language useful. See Thro, The Third Wave, supra note
24, at 248. There is some evidence that many state constitutions borrowed clauses from
other states previously admitted to the Union. See Thro, Role of Language, supra note
3, at 22 n.22. Therefore, it may be necessary to look to the original state's constitutional
history as well. See Alexander, supra note 14, at 352 (noting that one common state
constitutional clause is called the "New England clause" because "it emanated from early
consideration of public education in that region").
316. See Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 610.
317. Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 22, 31.
318. Id. at 22.
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categories.319 In addition, courts have not always adhered to the
scholars' categories, so the outcome of the textual analysis in a
particular case is somewhat unpredictable; this may result in the
scholars' categorizations having less influence on other courts.3"
Still, the classifications provide a means for comparing the standards
of the different state constitutions. Most commentators place the
education clauses into four groups.32 According to Thro's clas-
sification scheme, Category I clauses require only that the legislature
set up a system of free public schools.3 Category II clauses require
a minimal level of quality such as "thorough" or "efficient."
32
Those clauses with stronger mandates, but without explicit quality
standards, are considered to be in Category I.l24 Finally, Category
IV clauses establish education as an important-in some cases, the
most important-duty of the state.3"
319. See id. Compare Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public
Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEx. L. REV. 777,814-16 nn.143-46 (1985)
(categorizing the clauses according to the strength of the educational mandate they
impose) with Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 23-25 (adopting Ratner's basic
framework, but disagreeing with Ratner about the placement of some states' claims).
McUsic categorizes the clauses differently, depending on their support for different types
of claims. See McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 319-26 (categorizing the
clauses according to the extent to which they support an "equity" claim); a at 333-39
(categorizing the clauses according to the extent to which they support a claim that a
minimum standard of education is required).
320. Cf. Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 611 (concluding that "if one accepts
the proposition that the language of the state education clauses matters, both the McDuffy
and the McWherter courts reached the wrong result"). In fact, the Tennessee case,
Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139,150 (Tenn. 1993), may make the
categories even less persuasive to other courts. See Thro, Tennessee, supra note 52, at 24-
25 (concluding that, despite the Tennessee Supreme Court's "lengthy discussion" of the
education clause, it ultimately was unclear whether the Court had accepted or rejected the
theory that the language of the clause should be outcome-determinative).
321. This Comment uses the classification scheme initially developed by Ratner and
modified by Thro. See Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 22 & n.23 (citing Erica
Black Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier The Right to Bilingual Education, 9 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 52, 66-70 (1974); Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban
Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777,814-16, nn.143-46
(1985)). Other scholars have also favored a classification scheme that consists of four
categories. See, eg., McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 320-26, 334-39; see also
supra notes 326-27 and accompanying text.
322. Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 23; see; e.g., TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12;
N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
323. Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 23-24; se4 e.g., DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1;
KY. CONST. § 183; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
324. Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 24; see e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1;
IOWA CONST. art. IX, 2d, § 3; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
325. Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 25; see, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2;
GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
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Because scholars disagree as to how North Carolina's education
clause should be'classified,326 there are arguments that support both
sides in Leandro. At least two scholars believe that North Carolina's
clause imposes a minimal quality standard, if any, on the legis-
lature3 7 However, the plaintiffs should emphasize that other
scholars classify the North Carolina Constitution in a category that
demands a slightly higher quality standard 3 Thro places North
Carolina in his Category II,329 and points out that some of the
plaintiffs in the leading cases of the third wave obtained victories in
Category II states.3° Yet Thro concedes that "uniform" language
326. Thro concludes that the language of uniform quality in North Carolina's clause,
see N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2, requires a minimal level of quality. See Thro, Role of
Language, supra note 3, at 23-24 & n.24. McUsic places language requiring education to
be "general" and "uniform" in her weakest category-clauses that offer a minimum
commitment to educational quality but no specific standard. See McUsic, Education
Clauses, supra note 20, at 338-39 & n.147.
327. See McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 338-39 & n.147; Thro, Role of
Language, supra note 3, at 23-24 (citing Gershon Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban
Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777,815 n.144 (1985)).
(Thro himself disagrees with Ratner's categorization. See Thro, Role of Language, supra
note 3, at 23 nn.24, 28.) McUsic analyzes the clauses in terms of their textual support for
equality in addition to their textual support for an adequacy standard. Therefore, she
concludes that some states' constitutions have strong textual support for one type of claim,
but not another. For example, she includes North Carolina in the category of state
constitutions that "provide the strongest commitment to equality, by actually using the
word 'equality' in defining the state's obligation." McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note
20, at 320. However, North Carolina scores considerably worse on the measure of support
for an adequacy claim. McUsic places North Carolina in the category of "state
constitutions that require education for all, but express a minimal commitment to
educational quality." Id. at 338.
328. See Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 23-24 & nn.24, 28. Alexander also
considers "general" and "uniform" language to have substantive meaning. See Alexander,
supra note 14, at 353-54. Classification of the North Carolina Constitution's education
clause as Category II does not guarantee a victory for the plaintiffs because cases in states
with these types of clauses have resulted in outcomes favoring either side. See Thro, Role
of Language, supra note 3, at 26-27.
329. Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 23 n.28. Thro originally agreed with
Ratner that North Carolina was a "typical" Category I state. See Thro, The Third Wave,
supra note 24, at 243 n.131. Later, however, he concluded that some of Ratner's
classifications were erroneous and that North Carolina was more properly classified as a
Category I state. Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 23 n.28.
330. Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 247-49 n.168; see Rose v. Council for
Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769
P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
However, the reader should note that, at the time Thro made this observation, he still
considered North Carolina to be a Category I state. See Thro, The Third Wave, supra note
24, at 243 n.131; see also supra note 327. His later classification of North Carolina in
Category I appeared to be simply a correction of the previous classification, rather than
a reconsideration of the parameters of Category ]I. See Thro, Role of Language, supra
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standing alone provides weak support for these claims.331 A court
could use the word "uniform to uphold a system of underfunded and
inadequate schools.3" Furthermore, every Category II state in
which a plaintiff won, except Montana, had "efficient" language in its
education clause.333 McUsic observes that while constitutions with
"thorough and efficient" language have been held to require a specific
quality standard, no state court has held the language "general" or
"uniform" to do so.3' Nevertheless, more recent successful cases
in Tennessee335 and Massachusetts 336 -both states without a consti-
tutional quality standard337-support the Leandro plaintiffs' position
on this issue. The Tennessee Constitution does not require uniformi-
ty, efficiency, or a thorough system,338 yet the Tennessee Supreme
Court interpreted the entire education clause, which recognizes the
"inherent value of education," to be a specific mandate to the
legislature.
339
The Leandro court may also choose to consult the relevant
history of North Carolina's education clause, including the intent of
the framers and the more general history of education in the state, as
well as the treatment of the history of education by courts in other
states. The Kentucky Supreme Court took this approach in Rose v.
Council for Better Education, Inc., 4  which suggested that the
importance of education may be more persuasive than any particular
note 3, at 23-24 & n.28. Therefore, the cases from other Category II states could provide
persuasive authority for the Leandro plaintiffs.
331. Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 27.
332. Id. at 29.
333. Id at 27.
334. McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 338.
335. Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W2d 139 (Tenn. 1993).
336. McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Edue., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
337. Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 611 (noting that "[b]oth the Massachusetts
and Tennessee education clauses are Category I clauses which cannot be regarded as
imposing a quality standard").
338. See TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12.
339. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 150 (citing TENN. CONST. art. X, § 12); see also Thro,
Tennessee, supra note 52, at 21 (describing the Tennessee Court's interpretation of this
constitutional provision). North Carolina's constitution contains supplemental language,
both in the education article and elsewhere in the text, that the court could incorporate
in its interpretation. The education article states that "the means of education shall
forever be encouraged." N.C. CONST., art. IX, § 1. The constitution also includes a
Declaration of Rights, which states: "The people have a right to the privilege of
education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right." N.C. CONST.,
art. I, § 15.
340. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
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language in the constitution. 41  The Rose court examined the
motives of the Kentucky Constitution's framers, and determined that
they believed education to be fundamental to a republican form of
government? 2  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court also
conducted an extensive historical analysis of the framing and language
of its state constitution, as well as a lengthy review of the history of
public education in the state, to determine in McDuffy v. Secretary of
the Executive Office of Education' that its system was un-
constitutional.'
The outcome of such an analysis by a North Carolina court is
difficult to predict, because it appears to depend on the court's
interpretation of the state's history in the area of public education.
If the court accepts the view taken by the court of appeals in
Britt,45 it is unlikely that it will strike down the school finance
system based on the state's historical commitment to education, as
Kentucky and Massachusetts did." However, a strong argument
may be made that North Carolina has a history of supporting public
schools-as one of the first states to establish a public education
system, the state has historically provided substantial funding-and
there may indeed be a fundamental right to an adequate education
under the North Carolina Constitution" If the court embraces the
view that there is a historically based fundamental right, it could
reject the Britt version of history as flawed and reach a different result
in Leandro."
341. Id. at 205-06; see also Alexander, supra note 14, at 350-51 (detailing the Kentucky
Supreme Court's methodology).
342. Rose, 790 S.W2d at 205; see also Alexander, supra note 14, at 350-51 (discussing
the Kentucky court's adoption of the "common school" philosophy).
343. 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
344. Id. at 523, 548.
345. Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282,357 S.E.2d 432, disc.
rev. denied, 320 N.C. 790,361 S.E2d 71 (1987). See supra notes 221-50 and accompanying
text for the view taken in Britt and criticism of that analysis.
346. Courts in Kentucky and Massachusetts used their states' historical commitment to
education as a basis for the conclusion that their school finance systems were unconstitu-
tional. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 205-06, 212; McDuffy, 615 N.W.2d at 522-48.
347. See supra notes 235-50 and accompanying text.
348. There appears to be ample evidence to bolster a revision of Britt's historical
accounts. See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text. John A. Nelson also argues that
the third wave cases are so persuasive that any state court finding wide disparities but
failing to find an adequacy standard must do so only by concluding that its state's historical
commitment to education is weaker than that of other states, such as Kentucky and West
Virginia. Nelson, supra note 286, at 46.
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Another standard method of constitutional interpretation
available to the court is an analysis of cases from other states with
similar constitutional provisions. 9  In Pauley v. Kelly," a case
based on an adequacy argument, the West Virginia Supreme Court
reviewed the treatment of similar constitutional language in other
states and determined that history should serve as a guideline for the
court in defining the meaning of "thorough and efficient. '"' The
Kentucky Supreme Court also used this method of analysis and
recommended it to other states faced with interpreting their education
clauses.
35 2
Predicting the Leandro court's conclusion on the basis of
numerous decisions from other states is virtually impossible. Because
of the substantial number of cases decided both for and against
reform of school finance systems, both sides will find persuasive
support from other jurisdictions. However, the plaintiffs would
benefit by downplaying the losses in the first and second waves353
and emphasizing the third wave cases, 54 especially the most recent,
as clear trends in case law addressing state school financing?55 For
example, North Carolina's public school finance system has much in
common with the system struck down in Kentucky.3 5 Both systems
suffer from extreme property wealth inequities between urban and
rural areas57 and poor student achievement overall 58 Further-
more, the first major third wave cases occurred in states with
349. See supra note 315 and accompanying text. The court should choose states with
history and constitutional language that are similar to North Carolina's. See infra notes
356-59 and accompanying text.
350. 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
351. Id. at 874; see also Nelson, supra note 286, at 41-42 (discusing the Pauley decision).
352. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W2d 186,210 n.19 (Ky. 1989).
353. See supra notes 26-52 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 53-81 and accompanying text.
355. Cf. Alexander, supra note 14, at 345-47 (describing how decisions such as Rose in
Kentucky are eroding judicial deference to legislative control over education); see also
supra notes 53-81 and accompanying text.
356. "[T]he Kentucky Supreme Court was deeply affected by the poor record of
achievement of the state's public schools when compared to other states in the Union.
Much the same story could be told about the state of public education in North Carolina."
A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 52 (referring to Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc.,
790 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1989)).
357. See LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 6 (describing inequities in North
Carolina); Alexander, supra note 14, at 348 (describing inequities in Kentucky).
358. See A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 52 (noting this similarity between the two
states).
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education clauses similar to North Carolina's. 9 Finally, two of the
most recent successful third wave cases occurred in Tennessee3 6 and
Massachusetts,3 61 states whose constitutions are viewed by some
scholars as containing no quality standard.3
On the other hand, the State would benefit from relying on the
unsuccessful challenges to state school finance systems of the second
wave,363 especially North Carolina's own negative precedent.
3' 6
The State should point out that no court has based a decision solely
on constitutional language mandating a "uniform" system of
schools3  In addition, the State could counter the plaintiffs'
recitation of the recent trend of plaintiff victories by detailing a recent
state victory in Minnesota, Skeen v. State.3" The Minnesota Consti-
tution contains language almost identical to the North Carolina
Constitution, calling for a system that is "general and uniform."367
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court found that the education
clause placed a duty on the legislature, it held that the current funding
system was adequate, because it "provide[d] uniform funding to each
student in the state in an amount sufficient to generate an adequate
level of education which meets all state standards."3  Thro notes
that the state standards referred to by the court probably were "the
359. Thro, The Third Wave, supra note 24, at 247-48 (noting that Montana, Kentucky,
and Texas have Category II education clauses-the same category into which North
Carolina's clause falls). Recently in Arizona-a Category I state, see Thro, Role of
Language, supra note 3, at 23 n.24-the state supreme court overturned its school finance
system on the basis of "general" and "uniform" language. See Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist.
No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 815-16 (Ariz. 1994).
360. See Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993).
361. See McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass.
1993).
362. See supra notes 57-58, 80,335-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
cases. For a discussion of different scholars' analyses of state constitutional clauses, see
notes 318-25 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 40-52 and accompanying text.
364. Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C. App. 282,357 S.E.2d 432, disc.
rev. denied, 320 N.C. 790,361 S.E.2d 71 (1987). For a complete discussion of this case, see
supra notes 221-50 and accompanying text.
365. See McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 338.
366. 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
367. See id. at 308; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; N.C. CONsT. art. IX, § 2.
368. Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 315. Although the Minnesota Supreme Court found that
"[t]he structure and history of the Minnesota Constitution indicates that ... there is a
fundamental right to a 'general and uniform system of education,' " it separated out the
issue of funding and concluded that the "fundamental right does not extend to the funding
of the education system, beyond providing a basic funding level to assure that a general
and uniform system is maintained." Id.
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minimum standard[s] for accreditation set by the State Board of
Education."3 69  Because state boards of education revoke the
accreditation of few, if any, school systems,370 this amounts to an
extremely low quality standard for the legislature to uphold.
Despite the persuasive authority of Skeen, the State must be
careful in relying on it, because that may require conceding that the
constitution does mandate a quality standard? This concession
places the State in danger of losing at the next stage,37 since the
North Carolina court could impose a higher standard than the
Minnesota court did.373 In addition, the North Carolina State Board
of Education's own performance system has placed four of the
plaintiff districts on warning status for their failure to meet state
accountability standards.374 Therefore, even under a Minnesota-type
decision, although the plaintiffs would not obtain their goal of
substantial system-wide reform, the state still could be forced to make
some adjustments to the finance system to bring some of the state's
districts into compliance with the BEP
Reviewing constitutional structure is the third method of
interpretation the Leandro court may employ.3 75 The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court suggested that the purpose of the legislature's
duty to provide education, as revealed through the structure of the
state constitution, was "to meet the needs and interests of a republi-
can government," not simply to benefit the children of the state.376
The plaintiffs could use the Massachusetts court's theory of constitu-
tional structure to construct a similar argument. The argument would
assert that the education clause protects the entire state by requiring
the legislature to ensure that the children of the state become
369. Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 613.
370. Id.
371. The plaintiffs in Skeen conceded adequacy but argued that some districts of low
wealth suffered harm from having fewer resources than the wealthier districts. See Skeen,
505 N.W.2d at 303, 315.
372. See infra notes 395-402 and accompanying text (describing Thro's methodology for
determining the meaning of the quality standard articulated by the education clause).
373. Cf. Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 612-14 (contrasting the standards
selected by different courts that have considered this issue).
374. LoCAL FiNANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 4.
375. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
376. McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 548 (Mass.
1993). The Arizona Supreme Court also recognized this point, stating that "[t]he
education provisions of the constitution acknowledge that an enlightened citizenry is
critical to the existence of free institutions, limited government, economic and personal
liberty, and individual responsibility." Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877
P.2d 806, 816 (Ariz. 1994).
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productive citizens. Similarly, the Tennessee Supreme Court used a
constitutional structure argument to dismiss the lack of language
specifically mandating a quality standard.3 The court asserted that
the failure of the Tennessee constitution to include modifiers for the
word "education" was of little importance.378 The court stated:
"[T]he word 'education' has a definite meaning and needs no
modifiers in order to describe the precise duty imposed upon the
legislature.... Indeed, modifiers would detract from the eloquence
and certainty of the constitutional mandate .... ,,379
Several urban districts that have intervened in Leandro have
raised another structural argument.3 These urban districts argue
that the state has a duty under the constitution and state statutes to
provide an adequate education to the children of the state.3 " North
Carolina has delegated some of this authority to the local school
boards.3" The intervening urban school boards allege that they are
unable to fulfill their duties as school boards under state law because
the state has failed to provide sufficient funding, in violation of its
constitutional and statutory obligations.3 The intervening districts'
claim could be read as a declaration that the state's ultimate
responsibility for education under the constitution cannot be
delegated-that is, that only the specific duties implementing the
responsibility are delegable, but not the responsibility per se-and
therefore, any delegation of authority to local school boards fails to
relieve the state of its responsibility to provide a general and uniform
system of public schools.3  Because the five plaintiff counties also
377. Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 150-51 (Tenn. 1993).
378. Id. at 150.
379. Id.
380. The intervening school boards are Asheville City, Buncombe County, Charlotte-
Mecklenburg, Durham, Wake County, and Winston-Salem/Forsyth County. Intervening
Complaint, Leandro v. State, No. 94 CVS 520 (N.C. filed May 25, 1994).
381. Id. at 2, 6.
382. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-47(1) (1994) ("It shall be the duty of local boards of
education to provide adequate school systems within their respective local school
administrative units, as provided by law.")
383. Intervening Complaint at 6, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520).
384. See id. at 6. The North Carolina Civil Liberties Union has alleged that "the State
does not satisfy its duty to fund a basic education simply by delegating financial
responsibility to the localities." A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 43. The plaintiffs in
Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994), argued this point
under similar constitutional language. See Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 813. The Arizona
Supreme Court accepted this argument and held that because the legislature chose a
finance system which created disparities, the legislature failed to fulfill its duty under the
state constitution. Id, at 813, 815.
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include local school boards that are fiscally responsible under the
North Carolina statutes,3" an identical argument could be made on
their behalf. 6
In turn, the State should argue that the North Carolina
Constitution, unlike the Tennessee Constitution," does include
modifiers such as "general and uniform"" and that these modifiers
alone have never been held to require a specific quality standard.? 9
Therefore, the State could assert that, because the two state
constitutions have dissimilar language, the North Carolina court
should not follow the Tennessee case 9  and should not find a
quality standard in the North Carolina Constitution. In response to
the structural argument suggested by the intervening districts, the
State could counter that the legislature's duty toward education is
defined by the constitution, and that statutory and constitutional
obligations should be considered separately.3 91  Thus, the State
could argue that if the state constitution mandates no duty or quality
standard for the legislature, there can be no constitutional
385. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §115C-47(1) (1994).
386. For an example of how such an argument could be constructed in North Carolina,
see A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 43-44. The North Carolina Civil Liberties Union
finds support for this structural argument in a 1907 case, Collie v. Commissioners of
Franklin County, 145 N.C. 170,59 S.E. 44 (1907). In Collie, the North Carolina Supreme
Court found that a constitutional limitation on taxation did not prohibit the legislature
from levying additional taxes to support public schools. Id. at 173, 59 S.E. at 46. The
Collie court acknowledged that the constitution must be "construe[d] ... as a whole, for
it was adopted as a whole," id., and stated, "It is hardly probable [the people] intended by
a previous enactment in the same instrument to render it impossible to carry out [the
educational] purposes expressed in such earnest and unmistakable language," id at 175,
59 S.E. at 46. The North Carolina Civil Liberties Union argues that this case means that
"the obligation to finance an adequate education supersedes even constitutional limitations
on the taxing power," and concludes that "if an expenditure is necessary to a basic
education, it must be paid for." A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 43. Thus, "the State
does not satisfy its duty to fund a basic education simply by delegating financial
responsibility to the localities." Id.
387. See TENN. CONsT. art. XI, § 12.
388. See N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1).
389. McUsic, Education Clauses, supra note 20, at 338; see also supra note 326-27.
390. Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W2d 139 (Tenn. 1993). The
Tennessee Supreme Court held that "the word 'education'... needs no modifiers in order
to describe the precise duty imposed on the legislature." Id. at 150.
391. Since the State has strong arguments that the North Carolina Constitution defines
no quality standard, separating the two issues seems practical. Also, claims of statutory
violations have not been used successfully to bring about radical reform in a school finance
system. See infra notes 436-37 and accompanying text.
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violation,3" and statutory obligations cannot increase this
constitutional duty.
The final chapter of the analysis for a quality standard under a
state constitution depends on whether or not the foregoing
analysis-of the text, the history, and the original intent of the
education clause-is conclusive on the issue of whether a standard of
educational quality is required. 3 If the Leandro court fails to find
the analysis up to this point conclusive, it must determine the plain
meaning of the text of the constitution.39
3. Describing the Quality Standard
If the Leandro court finds that the North Carolina Constitution
mandates a quality standard, additional steps in Thro's analysis are
required. The third step in this methodology requires the court to
define the quality standard. 9 This decision becomes outcome-
determinative because while a high, demanding standard will almost
always result in finding that a system is in violation of its
constitutional mandate, a lower, more lenient standard will generally
result in the current system being upheld.396 Courts often have
failed to detail their reasons for choosing one standard over numerous
others.39  The range of decisions is vast. The Kentucky 98 and
Massachusetts399 decisions represent the most sweeping pronoun-
cement of constitutional requirements of adequacy, the Minnesota
Court chose a minimal standard,"' and several decisions lie in
between these two extremes.
392. Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 610.
393. See Thro, Role of Language, supra note 3, at 31.
394. See id.
395. Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 612. Thro refers to this step as the least




398. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
399. McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
400. Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 612. Both Kentucky and Massachusetts
chose high, demanding quality standards and gave detailed guidelines for a constitutionally
adequate school system. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211-12; McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554. In
addition, the Kentucky decision invalidated the state's entire public school system. See
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215; see also infra note 424 and accompanying text.
401. Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 613 (interpreting Skeen v. State, 505
N.W.2d 299, 308 (Minn. 1993)).
402. Thro, JudicialAnalysis, supra note 3, at 613. See, e.g., Helena Elem. Sch. Dist, No.
1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 691 (Mont. 1989) (declaring Montana's state accreditation
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In Leandro, the plaintiffs claim a fundamental right to an
adequate education under the constitution and leave the court to
struggle with defining adequacy.' Clearly, North Carolina courts
will wrestle with this issue with little guidance.4" Because the
state's constitution contains language similar to the. Minnesota
Constitution,' it is possible that a court could choose a standard
similar to the minimal one chosen in Skeen v. State.' There, the
Minnesota Supreme Court apparently concluded that an education
was "adequate" if it met standards set by the State Board of
Education. In North Carolina, a parallel standard would be the
BEP's promise of a "basic" education.' The choice of this stan-
dard would not guarantee a complete victory for the State. The
BEP remains underfunded, and many North Carolina counties fail to
standards the minimum standards only, and not the basis for defining educational quality);
Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 365-66 (NJ. 1990) (requiring at least "a modicum of
variety and a chance to excel").
403. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 24, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520). Commentators and courts
have struggled with this concept. See Nelson, supra note 286, at 41-46. John Nelson points
out that the court's definition of a constitutional adequacy standard can be helpful to the
state in other areas of educational policy. Id. at 12-15. For example, adequacy guidelines
could assist a state in determining spending levels and proficiency standards. See id. at 14-
15. There is no federal standard of adequacy, id. at 15, although Rodriguez does suggest
that an implied adequacy standard may exist in the Federal Constitution, id. at 16 (citing
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973)). The Rodriguez court
upheld Texas's school finance scheme, which was challenged under the federal Equal
Protection Clause. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 55. However, some scholars have concluded
that the Court "implied that an adequacy standard might be found," Nelson, supra note
286, at 14, because it stated:
Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financing system
occasioned an absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children,
... no charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child
with an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoy-
ment of the rights of speech and of full participation in the political process.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
404. Thro notes that a few courts have ignored the question altogether. One court
dismissed the complaint and another decided for the plaintiffs on another ground. Thro,
Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 613-14; see Gould v. Orr, 506 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Neb.
1993) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v.
McWherter, 851 S.W2d 139 (Tenn. 1993), 151-52 (holding that the Tennessee constitution
mandated a quality standard, but declining to describe the parameters of the standard).
405. See supra note 367 and accompanying text.
406. 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993).
407. Id. at 315; see also Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 613 (discussing Skeen);
supra notes 365-69 and accompanying text.
408. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81(al) (1994); see also supra notes 99-100 and
accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 366-74 and accompanying text.
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offer the full program prescribed by the statute.41° Therefore, even
adoption of a minimum standard based on state requirements may
create trouble for the State, because not all the districts are complying
with the state's own standards for a basic education.41 In addition,
there is also a chance that the North Carolina court would follow the
Kentucky Supreme Court's lead,"2 because of North Carolina's
similar history of poor student achievement, 13 and choose a high
standard with guidelines for the legislature.4 4
4. Applying the Chosen Quality Standard to the System
The fourth step in the analysis is an assessment of the perfor-
mance of the state legislature in upholding its duties under the court's
definition of the quality standard.4L  Thus, the chosen standard
greatly affects, and may conclusively determine, the outcome in this
stage.416 The plaintiffs should present expert testimony and statis-
tical studies addressing the correlation between expenditures and
quality of education, disparities in property wealth and tax base,
disparities in per-pupil expenditures, and actual harm to the
children.4 7 Although the plaintiffs in Leandro will have many
studies, reports, and position papers to present to the court to
demonstrate the inequalities and inadequacies of the North Carolina
school system,41 1 the evidence presented may be insufficient to
justify overturning the system, unless they convince the court to adopt
a demanding quality standard.419
410. See supra notes 101-02, 137,141 and accompanying text; A RIGHT DENIED, supra
note 19, at 35-36.
411. LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 4; see also supra notes 137, 141 and
accompanying text.
412. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
413. See id. at 197; see also supra notes 356-58 and accompanying text.
414. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212; see also supra notes 299,400 and accompanying text.
415. See Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 614.
416. Id. Thro goes so far as to say that the resolution of these issues is "academic. If
the standard is high, the system fails. Conversely, if the standard is low, the system passes
muster." Id.
417. See Dayton, supra note 35, at 636-37; cf. McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office
of Educ., 615 N.W.2d 516,553-54 (Mass. 1993) (reviewing evidence of poor school facilities
and poor student achievement); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186,
196-97 (Ky. 1989) (reviewing evidence of student achievement and comparing the
opportunities of students in poor versus affluent districts).
418. See ADM ALLOTMENTS, supra note 106; ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM, supra note
106; EASTERN NORTH CAROLINA, supra note 106, at 1-3; GRADING ON THE CURVE, supra
note 106, at 1-4; LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95; A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19,
at 10-35.
419. See supra notes 396, 398-402 and accompanying text.
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5. Determining the Role Played by Funding*
in School System Deficiencies
If the court finds a constitutional violation, it should proceed to
the next stage of the analysis in Thro's methodology and determine
the relationship between money and the violation.4' This relation-
ship can be quite complex, and courts that explore it in depth may
find that factors other than funding bear-or at least
share-responsibility for the violation. 2' Thro suggests that the
only court yet to address this issue has been the Kentucky Supreme
Court.' According to Thro, while other courts have simply as-
sumed that the problem was money4' and have ignored numerous
other possibilities, the Kentucky court faced the problem squarely and
declared the entire system of schools unconstitutional.4 As Thro
points out, courts that focus solely on money may fail to reach the
root of the problems, and therefore ultimately fail to improve the
system.4z
It is impossible to predict a North Carolina court's determination
of the role of money in any constitutional violation that may be iden-
tified.4' Furthermore, if the court follows Thro's methodology, it
will consider a number of factors in addition to money. The outlook
of the Kentucky court demonstrates the realistic view that there is
likely more than one cause of a system with low overall achievement
and significant disparities in quality of education.4'
420. Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 615.
421. Id. at 616. Relevant "other factors" could include "mismanagement, excessive
administration, lack of competent teachers, misplaced spending priorities, outright
corruption, nepotism, an improper emphasis on some programs, the need to bus to achieve
racial desegregation and the necessity of complying with other federal mandates." Id. at
615.
422. Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 616 (citing Rose v. Council for Better
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989)).
423. Id. (citing McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 556
(Mass. 1993)).
424. Id. at 616-17. The Kentucky court stated, "Lest there be any doubt, the result of
our decision is that Kentucky's entire system of common schools is unconstitutional....
This decision applies to the statutes creating, implementing and financing the system and
to all regulations, etc., pertaining thereto." Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215.
425. Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 616. Thro suggests that these courts
abdicate their judicial responsibility and take an unrealistic view of modem education by
focusing solely on funding remedies. Id. at 616.
426. The court in Leandro may want to address this issue, however, given that other
courts have been criticized for ignoring it. Id. at 616.
427. See id. at 616 & n.112.
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B. Claims of Statutory Violations
The plaintiffs in Leandro claim relief under four sections of the
North Carolina General Statutes.4' Section 115C-1 codifies the
constitutional commitment to a "general and uniform system of free
public schools... wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for
all students."'429 Section 115C-81 mandates that the state system
provide "equal access" to the BEP,4"° and section 115C-408 states
that it is the policy of the state to provide for "current operations...
as defined in the standard course of study."' Finally, section 115C-
122(3) requires the state to "prevent denial of equal educational and
service opportunity on the basis of national origin, sex, economic
status, race, religion, [or] ... handicap."4'
The plaintiffs in Leandro have reason to feel confident that their
claims of several statutory violations will succeed. For instance, the
court may easily find that the lack of funding for the BEP violates
sections 115C-81 and 115C-408.433 Furthermore, in addition to using
the statutory claims for their own reform potential,4' the plaintiffs
are using the statutes to support their claim that the state education
clause does indeed confer a standard of quality, and that the state
legislature has recognized this fact and its obligation by enacting these
statutes.435 Although no decision to date has relied solely upon a
state statute to reform a school finance system, a statutory violation
combined with a constitutional violation may be quite convincing to
a court. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court held in Abbott
v. Burke436 that the state's system of public education financing
428. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 27-28, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520) (alleging violations of
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-1, -81, -408, -112(3) (1994)).
429. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-1 (1994).
430. Id. § 115C-81(al) (1994).
431. Id. § 115C-408(b) (1994).
432. Id. § 115C-122(3) (1994). The plaintiffs' complaint highlights the portion of this
statute that refers to "economic status." Plaintiffs' Complaint at 28, Leandro (No. 94 CVS
520).
433. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81 mandates "equal access" to the BEP. Section 115C-
408 provides for funding for the BEP; see supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text. The
plaintiffs' complaint asserts that 36.1% of the BEP remains unfunded and that if funding
continues at the rate set in the 1994 budget, full funding will not be complete for 30 years.
Plaintiffs' Complaint at 10, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520).
434. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 27-28, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520).
435. See id.
436. 575 A.2d 359 (NJ. 1990).
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violated the state constitution and the New Jersey Code, which called
for "[a] breadth of program offerings."'437
C. Intervening Complaint
The Leandro plaintiffs are not alone in their dissatisfaction with
the state's funding system. Six urban districts filed an intervening
complaint in the litigation that echoes the claims of the plaintiffs.438
These six urban districts all display some of the characteristics
attributed to the wealthy districts of the state.439 However, they
face funding problems similar to those of the poorer counties because
the state has failed to fund the entire cost of education."0 In
addition, the urban districts face their own distinct problems." The
urban districts' claims for relief mirror those of the low-wealth
districts, and they raise similar issues."2 This is evidenced by the
intervenors' support of the plaintiffs' call for increased state fun-
ding."3  However, the intervening districts will rely on slightly
437. Id at 398 (quoting NJ. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-5d (West 1989)).
438. See Intervening Complaint, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520).
439. See LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 18-19. Four of the intervening
districts--Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Durham, Wake, and Winston-Salem/Forsyth-ranked
among the top six counties in the state in 1994 in their ability to pay. The other two
intervening districts, Buncombe County and Asheville, are both in Buncombe County,
which ranked 24th. Id. The "ability to pay" measure was calculated as follows:
It is a combined measure of revenue that would have been generated at the state
average tax rate based on 1993/94 property valuations per student adjusted to
reflect current market prices and to account for differences in income levels and
the value of non-property tax revenues, such as the county's share of local option
sales taxes, and fines and forfeitures. Each county's mandated welfare payments
were also subtracted from the total adjusted revenues.
Id. at 19.
440. See A RIGHT DENIED, supra note 19, at 36 ("The state share is thus far less than
what North Carolina itself has calculated to be the cost of a minimally adequate
education."). The urban counties also allege difficulties funding capital projects, municipal
overburden, and high concentrations of students living in poverty. Intervening Complaint
at 12, 14-15, 17, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520).
441. See supra note 169. Some urban districts face growing inner-city problems such
as high security costs, the higher cost of educating disadvantaged students, and costs of
desegregation efforts. See Intervening Complaint at 11-17, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520).
Some face problems associated with a rapidly growing urban population such as higher
costs of living, leading to a demand for increases in teacher salaries; a disproportionate
number of handicapped, special education, and academically gifted students; as well as the
costs of extra space and supplies needed to accommodate the increased school population.
See id.
442. See Intervening Complaint at 19-25, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520); Plaintiffs'
Complaint at 24-28, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520).
443. Intervening Complaint at 3, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520). The intervenors most
likely are motivated as well by their own desire to protect themselves from remedies that
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different authority than will the plaintiffs, including one of the most
significant cases in the development of school finance litigation. In
1990, the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down Abbott v.
Burke,' which may have been the first case to target the
distribution of resources to inner-city districts."5 The court held the
system unconstitutional for failing to address the needs and increased
costs of districts educating disadvantaged urban students." 6
In Leandro, the intervening school districts hope for at least some
elements of an Abbott verdict, although the two situations are very
different. 7 North Carolina's urban districts are experiencing some
inner-city problems,' but these districts overall are still among the
wealthiest in the state."9 The intervening districts must be careful
not to overstate their plight, or they could inadvertently invite the
court to dismiss their claim quickly on the assumption that they are
exaggerating.' The urban districts would benefit from focusing on
the analysis used in Abbott, in which the court recognized the
increased costs of meeting the needs of disadvantaged children,4"'
would negatively affect their own resources. See infra notes 528-29 and accompanying text
(discussing proposals to take funds from wealthy districts to increase funding for poorer
areas).
444. 575 A.2d 359 (NJ. 1990).
445. Benson, supra note 21, at 413.
446. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 402-03, 408. The court declared, "If the educational fare of
the seriously disadvantaged student is the same as the 'regular education' given to the
advantaged student, those serious disadvantages will not be addressed, and students in the
poorer, urban districts will simply not be able to compete." Id at 402-03. One
commentator has concluded that this statement means that, "in order to meet its objectives
in the poor, urban school districts, those districts required a level of resources beyond the
levels of educational provision in the richer, suburban districts." Benson, supra note 21,
at 415.
447. North Carolina does not have the severe disparities of wealth between urban and
suburban school districts that plagued New Jersey, see Abbott, 575 A2d at 394-98; instead,
North Carolina grapples with disparities between rural and urban districts, see NORTH
CAROLINA RURAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CENTER, NORTH CAROLINA RURAL
PROFILE: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TRENDS AFFECTING RURAL NORTH CAROLINA 3-5
(1992).
448. See supra notes 169, 440-41 and accompanying text (discussing problems of the
urban districts).
449. LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 7, 18; see also supra note 439 and
accompanying text.
450. The characterization of some of these districts as "high wealth," LOCAL FINANCE
STUDY, supra note 95, at 7, and their high rankings on the ability to pay measure, id. at
18; see also supra note 439, could lead a court to question the legitimacy of the districts'
claims. However, the districts could point out that even North Carolina's "wealthy"
schools are only average or below average in wealth when compared with schools
throughout the nation. Id. at 7; see also supra note 115 and accompanying text.
451. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 402-03 (NJ. 1990).
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rather than attempting to address the factual similarities between the
urban inner-city problems of northeastern cities and the cities of
North Carolina.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF LEANDRO
The plaintiffs in Leandro, like most third wave -plaintiffs,45
request a declaratory judgment that the state's system of financing
violates the state constitution and state statutes. 3  Because they
claim that the public education system, "including its system of
funding," violates the constitution,'" the plaintiffs appear to be
seeking a broad Kentucky-type verdict striking down the entire
system.4 s
The verdict the court renders can hold numerous policy
implications for the reform process,4 6 so the court must choose its
strategy and wording carefully.457 Vaguely phrased mandates can
leave legislators confused about precisely how to comply458 and can
render the search for a proper remedy problematic.4 9 On the other
hand, aggressive court oversight of the legislature may invite criticism
if the court's action is perceived to be beyond the scope of its proper
role.4"'
One scholar, George D. Brown, has noted that cases such as
McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Education4 ' contain a
"dissonance between rights and remedies."' 2  While the courts'
452. Cf George D. Brown, Binding Advisory Opinions: A Federal Courts Perspective
on the State School Finance Decisions, 35 B.C. L. RuV. 543, 564 (stating that "it is
noteworthy that several courts have emphasized that the case before them involved a
request for declaratory judgment").
453. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 28-29, Leandro (No. 94 CVS 520).
454. IL at 28.
455. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186,215 (Ky. 1989); see also
supra note 424 and accompanying text.
456. See Brown, supra note 452, at 545-46; Nelson, supra note 286, at 47.
457. See Levine, supra note 6, at 510-13; Nelson, supra note 286, at 47.
458. The hazards of an unclear mandate were demonstrated in Texas in the years
following the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Edgewood v. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby,
777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). See Levine, supra note 6, at 510-13; see also Nelson, supra
note 286, at 50 (noting that "[t]he frustration has caused one member of the Texas Senate
to remark that he wanted to surrender to the Court but he did not know where to turn
himself in" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
459. Brown, supra note 452, at 544, 548-50.
460. See Alexander, supra note 14, at 345-47 (acknowledging this criticism but
concluding that an "expanded judicial role in the oversight of legislative enactments" is
necessary in school finance cases).
461. 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
462. Brown, supra note 452, at 544.
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decisions on the merits of these cases may be bold and sweeping, 63
the boldness appears to evaporate when the court must decide on a
remedy: Courts tend to defer to the legislature to fashion the
specifics of the remedy. As a result, "[t]he plaintiffs have come
away from the case with a nice sounding declaration, but the state
judicial system has essentially remitted them to the legislature which
created them in the first place."'
A few theories have been applied by scholars attempting to
explain state courts' restrained approaches to remedies in school
finance litigation.4" The disparity theory, which seeks to explain
differences between federal and state courts,467 supports the view
that state court judges tend to defer to legislatures in these cases
because, as elected officials, the judges are not in a good position to
protect individual rights, if to do so would run counter to majoritarian
preferences. However, Brown argues in favor of a more expan-
sive view of the theory-one that recognizes the reality that state
courts and legislatures exist as partners in state government, with
substantial amounts of interaction.' 9 State courts may be reluctant
to order their partners to take specific actions.47
Brown views the state courts' decisions in the third wave cases as
generally positive and believes that state courts are developing a
judicial model of their own47' as they struggle to deal with their new
463. Id. at 543-44. Brown states, "[McDuffy] is a highly interesting example of state
judicial methodology, particularly in its bold derivation of individual rights and legislative
duties from the education clause of the Massachusetts Constitution. The'opinion leaves
no doubt that the current legislation will be overturned." Id.
464. Id. at 544.
465. Id.
466. See id. at 545-46:
467. See id. at 544. The disparity theory suggests that state courts cannot protect
individual rights and liberties as vigorously as federal courts, because of inherent structural
differences between the state and federal court systems. Id. at 544. A particularly
important difference between the two systems, according to disparity theorists, is the
relative insulation of federal courts from majoritarian pressures as compared to state
courts. Id at 552. While federal judges are appointed to life terms, state judges are
usually elected. Id. Disparity theorists also contend that state and federal judges differ
in terms of their technical competence and their attitudinal proclivities. I at 551-52.
468. See id. at 552-53.
469. Id. at 554. In Brown's view, "state supreme courts are, indeed, fearful of the
political consequences of ordering explicit remedies, but the consequences are those that
flow from a direct confrontation with the legislature"-not from the wrath of the
electorate. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id at 563-67.
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role as protectors of individual rights.4' Because state courts often
seem to recognize that their decisions in school finance cases are near
the edge of the judiciary's realm of power,473 they are developing a
dialogic model in this area rather than adopting the managerial model
that is typical of federal court decisions.474 In this model, the cases
create dialogue between the legislature and the courts-partners in
state government-in finding solutions to complex problems such as
school finance litigation.475 Although the court declares the legisla-
tive duty, its opinion merely serves as advice to the legislature on the
method of fulfilling the duty.476 Because these opinions are often
advisory in nature, and the court may analyze only the general
problems that extend across the state, Brown refers to them as
"binding advisory opinions."'4 These "binding advisory opinions,"
in the form of declaratory judgments, take the first step in the
remedial process by informing the parties of their respective rights
and duties.478 While the courts defer to the legislature for the
specifics of the remedy, they hold the advantage of initiating the
reform process and maintaining control over the subsequent imple-
mentation.479
472. Id. Because federal judicial relief has been unavailing in the school finance reform
area since the holding in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44, reh'g
denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973) (holding that equal protection challenges to school finance
schemes would be scrutinized under the rational relation test); see also supra notes 33-38
and accompanying text (explaining Rodriguez), Brown argues that the state courts must
now provide protection in this area. See Brown, supra note 452, at 560-61.
473. Brown, supra note 452, at 563. Brown notes that the courts often refer to the
political question doctrine, indicating their consciousness of how close they are to the
legislative line. Id.
474. Id., at 564-66. This model appears to serve as a solution to the political question
problem. See supra note 232 and accompanying text for more discussion of the political
question doctrine.
475. Id. at 566. Brown concludes that this approach to complex reform litigation
demonstrates "remedial wisdom": "Real change acceptable to the citizenry at large can
only come from the legislature." Id. at 566 (citing Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political
Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43,
79-82 (1979)).
476. Id. at 546; see, eg., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212
(Ky. 1989) (giving guidelines but not directing the legislature to "enact any specific legis-
lation").
477. Id. at 564. This terminology is merely descriptive; Brown points out the
differences between true advisory opinions and these opinions. Most importantly, the state
courts' treatment of these cases follows normal litigation procedure and requirements. Id
at 564-65.
478. Id. at 564.
479. Id at 564-66. Note that in many third wave cases, the court retains jurisdiction
over the case while the legislature formulates remedial action. Thro, The Third Wave,
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Because the dialogic model offers these advantages and circum-
vents the political question doctrine, ° the North Carolina court in
Leandro is likely to follow the advisory approach used by many third
wave courts. However, the court should be careful to give clear
direction to the legislature, while allowing it some flexibility of
remedies. ' The Kentucky decision is viewed as the most suc-
cessful court-developed standard of adequacy," detailing seven
areas in which all students should achieve competency!' Central
to the success of the Kentucky case, Alexander argues, was the fact
that the decision to strike the entire system kept the court from
intruding into the legislature's prerogative.' The court was then
able to give its "advice" in the form of general guidelines to help the
legislature develop a constitutional remedy.' 6
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Texas Supreme
Court's decision in Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby
(Edgewood 1), 'I which invalidated the school finance system, did
not clearly articulate any standards; this led to confusion, frustration,
and further litigation." s The Texas legislature's subsequent reform
efforts revealed this confusion, as it failed to distinguish between
adequacy and equality and thereby allowed the wealthiest
districts to be excluded from the equalization plan.' The plan
supra note 24, at 234-35 & n.78, 236 & n.93.
480. The political question issue was present in Britt v. State Bd. of Educ., 86 N.C.
App. 282, 290, 357 S.E.2d 432, 437, disc. rev. denied, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987);
see also supra note 232 and accompanying text (discussing Britt).
481. See Levine, supra note 6, at 510-13 (describing the Texas legislature's confusion
in meeting the court's mandate); see also supra notes 458-59 and accompanying text.
482. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
483. Nelson, supra note 286, at 47; see also Alexander, supra note 14, at 362 (noting
that the Kentucky court's guidelines "resolved the question" of what constitutes an
adequate education for purposes of the Kentucky constitution).
484. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212. The seven areas are listed supra in note 299.
485. Alexander, supra note 14, at 363-65. Alexander argues that striking selected
statutes would have required statutory revision, rather than allowing the legislature the
discretion to analyze the problem and tailor the remedy. It at 364. With this approach,
the legislature was free, in some respects, to study the issue and reform its school finance
plan by rewriting the statutes from a clean slate; thus, the legislature could attack the
problems that it determined to be the most appropriate. See id.
486. Id at 364.
487. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
488. Nelson, supra note 286, at 47, 49-51.
489. Id at 47.
490. Levine, supra note 6, at 510-11. The Edgewood I court required the legislature to
ensure that poor children would have "substantially" equal access to school funds. This
allowed some latitude for the legislature, which proceeded to omit some of the wealthiest
districts in computing the cost of equalizing the districts of the state. Id. at 510-11 (citing
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promised equal revenue for equal tax effort,49' but "only up to the
point necessary to maintain equality in the system as a whole," and
it still authorized local districts to supplement their schools with local
funding.49 It appeared, therefore, that the legislature had misunder-
stood the holding in Edgewood V 9  The proposed reform plan was
immediately challenged in court.494  In Edgewood II,4  the Texas
court clarified its holding, but in doing so it removed most of the
legislature's discretion: The new holding required the state to
guarantee equal revenue for equal tax effort. 496 As a result, equality
rather than quality has become the goal of many Texas legislators'
reform packages.4" Thus, while Kentucky's verdict in Rose v.
Council for Better Education, Inc.498 aided the legislature in reform,
the Texas court in Edgewood 1'9' only generated more prob-
lems.50
If the North Carolina court determines that the plaintiffs in
Leandro should prevail, it should heed the lesson from third wave
cases such as those in Kentucky and Texas. The guidelines for reform
in those cases fall into three general categories, each of which has
positive and negative policy implications.50 '
The first category, total revenue equality, requires that all school
district budgets be equal, and directs the state to guarantee this result
Edgewood I, 777 S.W.2d at 397).
491. Id. at 511; see also infra notes 523-30 and accompanying text (explaining access
equality).
492. Levine, supra note 6, at 511.
493. See id. at 511-12.
494. Id, at 511.
495. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991) (Edgewood I1).
496. Id. at 496-97; see also Levine, supra note 6, at 512-13 (contrasting the holdings in
Edgewood I and Edgewood II).
497. See Levine, supra note 6, at 529. Levine notes that it is ironic that "in many of
these proposals, the drive for equality, emphasized by the Edgewood opinions, often
outstrips the need for improved educational quality, an underlying motivation for the
entire litigation." Id.
498. 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
499. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
500. See Levine, supra note 6, at 510-13. In February 1991, the Texas court clarified
its holding in Edgewood II in a response to a motion for rehearing. Edgewood Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Kirby, No. D-0378, 1991 Tex. LEXIS 21 ('rex. Sup. Ct. Feb. 25, 1991). The court
stated, "[o]nce the Legislature provides an efficient system ... it may, so long as efficiency
is maintained, authorize local school districts to supplement their educational resources if
local property owners approve an additional local property tax." Id. at *6. Thus, a certain
amount of unequalized local revenue apparently is permitted under the Texas constitution.
Levine, supra note 6, at 542.
501. Levine, supra note 6, at 508-09, 520-528.
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regardless of differences in property wealth.'c This scheme pre-
vents future inequalities, as legislatures would no longer be allowed
to let the state share of funding decline, forcing local districts to make
up the difference."s However, the plan acts as a spending cap on
rich districts."° Critics of this type of plan argue that spending caps
eliminate local control and create the danger that the state education
budget will become stagnant, as the continuous pressure from poor
districts to raise funding diminishes instead of being led forward by
higher spending districts.ss Proponents of the theory believe the
opposite: Rich districts will increase pressure on the state to spend
more, and because the spending would be equal, poor districts would
benefit from the political power of the rich.5"
A North Carolina court considering this type of proposal would
have to take into account the state constitutional language: °7 Any
proposal that requires spending caps may prove to be unconstitutional
because localities in North Carolina have a constitutional right to
supplement their school funding with local funds."08 In addition,
there appears to be little support for capping spending, in wealthy
districts; as policy studies reveal, this stifles the initiative of wealthy
communities that would otherwise lead the state's definition of
adequacy forward."°
The second and most popular reform of the third wave courts is
minimum revenue equality 1 This concept calls for equal funding
at a level sufficient to provide an adequate education for every
student."' One drawback of this plan is that legislatures are left
502. Id. at 520-21. There are many ways to achieve this equality, including a state tax
or local tax that is redistributed, or a uniform local tax that the state uses to equalize the
amount of revenue between poor and wealthy districts. Id. at 520. Total revenue equality
has been required in only one case. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 408 (NJ. 1990).
503. Levine, supra note 6, at 521.
504. Id. at 521-22.
505. See id. With the rich districts unable to raise additional local funding, the level of
education will become equal, but there will be no districts investing in new methods and
technology, setting higher goals of quality education for the poor districts to attain through
political pressure. See id.
506. Id. at 522.
507. See id. at 537 (noting that many of the proposals in Texas may require a
constitutional amendment).
508. Local units "may use local revenues to add to or supplement any public school or
post-secondary program." N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(2). See also supra notes 231,280 and
accompanying text.
509. See ALL THAT'S WrrHN THEM, supra note 106, at 3.
510. See Levine, supra note 6, at 509, 523-26.
511. Id. at 524.
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with the difficult task of defining the standard of adequacy, and
finding a reliable funding source so that the state can provide an
adequate education to all children each year.SU The definition
forces legislatures-and sometimes courts-to determine which
aspects of funding are necessary and which are luxuriesYP In
addition, the courts and the people must trust the legislature not to
set low adequacy standards or to let adequacy standards stagnate.14
Total revenue equality may be more easily managed, but minimum
revenue equality guarantees adequate funding and allows districts to
supplement, therefore eliminating the "leveling down" effect of total
revenue equality.51 Preserving local control without disadvantaging
poorer districts is the goal of minimum revenue equality 16
Minimum revenue equality seems better suited for North
Carolina than total revenue equality because it retains the local
control guaranteed by the constitution while taking advantage of a
forward-looking standard of adequacy. A North Carolina court
should be skeptical of the legislature's political courage to enact true
reforms, however, if events in Texas are any indication of the likely
response. North Carolina's Basic Education Plan51 7 resembles
Texas's Foundation School Program,5 8 and North Carolina's lack of
commitment to funding that program is also similar to that in
Texas.51 9 Because of Texas's dismal performance with the Foun-
dation School Program, the Texas Supreme Court was reluctant to
trust the legislature to improve its support for the program, and
eliminated some of the legislature's discretion by mandating equal
access equality 25 A court may protect against this disadvantage by
512. Id.
513. Id. at 525.
514. Mi Levine points out that Texas had a minimum foundation program, based on
the principle of minimum revenue equality, that the legislature failed to fund. Id. at 525-
26. The court, obviously reluctant to trust the legislature to improve its performance with
this program, mandated access equality, which gave the legislature little room to maneuver
in reform. Id. at 526.
515. Levine, supra note 6, at 524-25.
516. Id. at 524.
517. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81 (1994); see also supra notes 100-02 (describing the
plan).
518. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 16.001 (West Supp. 1995). The program is designed to
provide equal funding up to the point considered necessary to finance an adequate
education. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 16.001-.002 (West Supp. 1995).
519. See Levine, supra note 6, at 526 (describing Texas's commitment to funding the
Foundation School Program); supra notes 100-02, 137, 141 and accompanying text.
520. See Levine, supra note 6, at 525.
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drafting an opinion with a clear but flexible standard of adequacy.521
Another possible safeguard would be for the court to lock the
legislature into true reform by maintaining jurisdiction over the case,
thus sending a message that the court will aggressively enforce the standard.'2
The third alternative, access equality, requires equal tax rates to
yield equal tax revenue5P Property-poor districts cannot raise as
much revenue as property-rich districts can at the same tax rate.524
In fact, some property-rich districts tax themselves at higher rates and
still generate less revenueP5  To help these poorer districts raise the
same amount of revenue as wealthier districts taxed at the same rate,
the state must supplement the funds to equalize revenue.5" Under
an equal access plan, local control is encouraged because poor
districts will have more money to spend, and no spending caps are
necessary.527 However, use of this theory may require the politically
unpopular "recapture" technique, which redistributes funds from
wealthier school districts to poorer ones;51 wealthy districts may go
to great lengths to prevent this result.529 Also, without a minimum
funding level set by the state, the plan does not ensure that adequate
education will be provided, because the funding will be in the hands
of the taxpayers and subject to the whims of the political process.
50
521. See supra notes 481-86 and accompanying text. The Leandro court could use the
Kentucky case as a model. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186
(Ky. 1989). The court's goal should be to maintain control over the legislature while
avoiding the problems that the Texas court's mandate caused.
522. See supra note 479 and accompanying text.
523. Levine, supra note 6, at 527. The difference between equal access and total
revenue equality is that with total revenue equality, the tax rates and revenue levels are
set centrally, while equal access allows spending to vary as local commitment to education
varies. See id at 522, 528.
524. LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 5.
525. Id.




530. Id. at 527-28. One feature of equal access is that local taxpayers determine their
commitment to education by setting the tax rate; therefore, spending may vary with local
commitment. See id. at 522, 528. Levine suggests that the "drive for equality" has
overshadowed the greater issue of educational quality. Id. at 529; see also supra notes 487-
500 and accompanying text (describing lessons from the Texas decision). Also, the
recapture plan has been associated with a "leveling down" effect, by which districts
become equal, but not by bringing the poorer district's quality and funding levels up to the
quality enjoyed in wealthy districts-instead, the wealthy districts' funding and education
drops to meet the poorer districts at some midpoint. See ALL THAT'S WrTHIN THEM,
supra note 106, at 3.
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It is unlikely that a pure equal access theory will be accepted in
North Carolina. Although such a plan preserves local control,
recapture remains extremely unpopular politically 3' Moreover, the
intervention of urban districts in Leandro may demonstrate that,
because wealthier districts face their own funding problems, recapture
is not a viable option for providing the state with an equalized base
for adequate education 32 The equal access option can be modified,
however, and recapture can be avoided. 33 In fact, all three of the
proposals can be tailored to meet specific state needs or court
mandates.'M Therefore, regardless of the court's exact holding, the
legislature would do well to examine these proposals, perhaps
combining several to incorporate the best aspects of each option while
minimizing their disadvantages. 3
CONCLUSION
As North Carolina prepares for what could be one of the most
explosive and emotional struggles of the decade, this Comment
attempts to introduce the history and predict the possible future of
school finance litigation. Leandro clearly represents a third wave case
raising the issues and utilizing the strategies of the other successful
plaintiffs.536 It is uncertain, though, which third wave cases from
other jurisdictions the North Carolina courts will find persuasive.
Although school finance litigation may be long and trying, 37 it
forces the state to evaluate its school finance system-an outcome
which most likely would not occur without legal intervention."3
Several commentators have compared the struggle of school finance
reform to the struggle for racial desegregation-another long and
painful undertaking in which litigation proved to be a primary impetus
531. See ALL THAT'S WITHIN THEM, supra note 106, at 3-4; LOCAL FINANCE STUDY,
supra note 95, at 7.
532. See supra notes 438-51 and accompanying text for discussion of the urban districts
and their complaint. See also LOCAL FINANCE STUDY, supra note 95, at 7 (acknowledging
the problems facing urban districts in North Carolina).
533. Levine, supra note 6, at 528. Recapture may be avoided by substituting state aid
from sources other than local property taxes. Id.
534. See id., at 528-37. Levine details plans considered by the Texas legislature in 1991.
Most of the plans combined two or more of the options with the court's mandate of access
equality. Id. at 528.
535. See id. at 528-29.
536. See Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 3, at 604-17 for a discussion of common
issues in third wave cases and their legal strategies.
537. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
538. Wyner, supra note 6, at 399-400.
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for real reform.539 Despite the many studies and pleas for education
finance reform, little progress has been realized through the political
process5 ° Thus, as education reformers weigh their options, they
may see opportunity in the litigation-based strategy of the civil rights
movement 4'
The notion that litigation is bad pervades our society, and the
upcoming bitter fight over school funding is sure to convince some
that courts should not be involved in determining financial policy in
the area of education. 2 Yet, North Carolina should look ahead
with anticipation to the state's encounter with school finance
litigation. States like Kentucky greeted their mandate with en-
thusiasm to help make Kentucky a leader in education reform, 43
while others have struggled along, resisting each step of the way.
5
4
In Leandro, the attorneys and the plaintiffs should educate the people
of North Carolina about the need for school finance reform, so that
no matter the outcome in court, the public will demand
adequate-and better-education for every child in the state.
MARGARET ROSE WESTBROOK
539. Id. at 399; Christopher F. Edley, Jr., Introduction: Lawyers and Education Reform,
28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 293, 293-94 (1991). Even with judicial mandates, legislatures are
often drawn "kicking and screaming into the remedial phase." Id. at 297.
540. Edley, supra note 539, at 293-94.
541. See id.; Wyner, supra note 6, at 399-400.
542. See Edley, supra note 539, at 297-99.
543. Alexander, supra note 14, at 344; Combs, supra note 5, at 375-76. The people of
Kentucky accepted the decision as if they knew it was morally necessary and long overdue.
Alexander, supra note 14, at 344. Experts from across the nation were employed to
revamp the Kentucky school system, and the three branches of government fulfilled their
constitutional obligations. Combs, supra note 5, at 376.
544. Wyner, supra note 6, at 398. Wyner cites the New Jersey legislature for modifying
an education reform measure designed to follow the state supreme court's ruling in Abbott
v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). Wyner, supra note 6, at 398. The modification
replaced increased spending for schools with property tax relief and capped school
spending to further relieve the tax burden. Id.
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